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MAXINE EICHNER*
This Article reconsiders the way in which conflicts between parenting
responsibilities and work are treated within the United States. It argues that the
two different legal models applied to this conflict-Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Family and Medical Leave Act-too narrowly define the
interests at stake in parenting. Under Title VII, parenting protections arise only
insofar as their absence can be linked to sex discrimination, while under the
FMLA, parenting protections arise only in response to medical needs or crisis
situations. Neither framework considers the needs of the employee, as a parent
and as a person, the needs of children, and the interests of communities.
The Article seeks to explain the divergence between the current legal
framework and the widespread public support for strong parenting protections.
It argues that prevailing tenets of liberalism-exaltation of independence, a
firm demarcation between public and private, and a neutral state-preclude
more robust parenting protections. It further contends that even feminist theory,
from which extensive critiques of existing parenting protections have issued, has
failed to contest many of these liberal tenets. Feminist theory, while rightly
arguing that parenting supports are needed for women to achieve equality, has
generally failed to support parenting for the other goods realized through it, as
well. This Article then urges a broader, community-oriented treatment of
parenting, one that actively promotes the welfare of parents, children, and the
relationships between them as collective societal goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Newspapers, public opinion polls, and political speeches all trumpet the
view that Americans strongly support children and believe in the importance of
good parenting. However, Americans are, in overwhelming numbers,
concerned that they are failing their children.' They are particularly concerned
* B.A. 1984, Yale College; J.D. 1988, Yale Law School. This Article has benefited
enormously from helpful comments received from Pamela Conover, Susan Bickford, Michael
Lienesch, Marion Crain, Steve Leonard, Eric Stein, Holloway Sparks, Carisa Showden,
Nicola Jones, Christina Ewig, and Wendy Simons. In addition, I am indebted to Michael
Klarman and Kevin Moore for their comments on an earlier draft.
1 According to a U.S. News and World Report poll, 83% of Americans said they thought
it harder in general to be a child today than a generation ago. See David Whitnan & Josh
Chetwynd, The Youth 'Crisis,' U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., May 5, 1997, at 24. According
to a Knight-Ridder poll of voters, nearly three-fourths worry about how children are being
raised at home. Blacks and whites, young and old, ranked lack of attention for children as the
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that they have too little time to spend with their children.2 It is therefore
surprising that where parenting responsibilities conflict with work-
unquestionably the activity that most limits parenting activities3-this
groundswell of support for children and parenting has resulted in very little
legal support for working parents. There is, in fact, less support than in any of
151 other industrialized countries.4 The absence of legal support is especially
second most important problem facing this country, following only crime. See Angie Cannon,
Parents Worry About Kids, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Feb. 4, 1996, at A31.
2 The "What Families Really Value" poll released on October 11, 1996 by the National
Parenting Association of New York found unexpected unity among parents across race,
gender, and income lines on naming the "family time famine" as a major concern. According
to the president of the association, "[w]hat does fall out of this survey is the enormous and, I
think, desperate search for more time with their children." H.J. Cummins, Family 7Ine More
Critical Than Family Values, Parents Say, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis, MN), Oct. 11, 1996, at
6A. A New York Tmes-CBS poll found that "4 in 10 [teenagers] lamented that their parents
sometimes or often do not make time for them." Editorial, Tough, Vulnerable Youth, S.F.
CHRON., July 18, 1994, at A18. See generally William A. Galston, Causes of Declining Well-
Being Among U.S. Children, in SEx, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY 290, 293-94 (David M.
Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
Popular opinion that parents are spending less time with their children appears justified
by the facts. According to a 1985 study by a University of Maryland sociologist, parents spent
an average of only seventeen hours per week with their children as compared to thirty hours
in 1965. See AMrrAi ETzIoNI, TIm SPmrr oF CoMMtrJTry 64 (1993); see also Andrew
Peyton Thomas, Self Centeredness Threatens Our Society, ARiz. REPUB., Mar. 28, 1995, at
B5 (citing study showing that parents in the United States spend less time with their children
than parents in any other nation in the world-40% less time than even a generation ago).
3 Ninety-six percent of fathers and 66% of mothers with school-aged children currently
work outside the home. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Hearing on S.5
Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 14 (1993) (statement of Sen. Wellstone). In all,
approximately 42% of the workforce comes from families with children under age 18. See
Thomas, supra note 2, at B5. More than half of the parents polled who said that they spent
too little time with their children reported that they did so because they had to spend time
working in order to support themselves and their families. See (3alston, supra note 2, at 294.
4 See infra Part II. According to a report released in February 1997 by a United Nations
agency, of 152 industrialized countries, the United States ranks dead last in benefits and
protections it offered to parenting. The report found that paid maternity leave is required by
law in about 80% of countries surveyed, and about a third of the countries permit these leaves
to last more than 14 weeks. Breaks for nursing mothers are required in more than 80
countries. Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Study: U.S. Mothers Face Stingy Maternity Benefits;
UN. Agency Finds Disparity with Other Nations, WAsH. PosT, Feb. 16, 1998, at A10. In
contrast, until the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2654 (1993), the United States did not guarantee any job protection at all. See CHiLD CARE,
PARENTAL LEAvE, AND THE UNDER 3s 10 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds.,
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surprising given the large number of Americans who support government help
in meeting children's needs.5
This Article challenges this curious state of affairs. I ask the reader to
consider why our society appears to value parenting so much and to be so
concerned about its condition, yet provides so little support for working
parents. At least part of the answer, I contend, derives from contestable
assumptions-about individuals, the relationships between individuals, and the
role of the state-that are part of the dominant liberal philosophy in the United
States.6 These assumptions, I argue, prevent formulation of a coherent legal
1991). Even after passage of the FMLA, the United States permits parental leave for only up
to 12 weeks and continues to provide no income replacement.
The flurry of recent attempts by politicians to appear "family friendly" demonstrates the
paltry scope of even the debate over support for working parents. The centerpiece of
Republican efforts is the Working Families Flexibility Act of 1997, which has been passed by
the House of Representatives and now appears stalled in the Senate. H.R. 1, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 4, 105th Cong. (1997). This proposal allows employees to forego overtime pay and
instead take extra time worked as compensatory time. The bill, however, does not guarantee
that compensatory time can be taken when the employee seeks to take it. Accordingly, it is
not clear that employees will have the ability to use the leave in a manner consistent with their
children's schedules. More importantly, the proposal addresses no workers besides those who
have been asked to work overtime by an employer in a given week. Furthermore, it does not
address any of the myriad other needs of workers who are parents.
President Clinton's proposal to aid working parents also cannot be said to take the work-
and-parenting bull by the horns. In seeking to include 24 hours of yearly unpaid leave for
employees to attend to children's extracurricular and educational activities, Clinton's proposal
would make the current statutory protections on family leave only slightly less inadequate. See
Family & Medical Leave Enhancement Act, H.R. 234, 105th Cong., (1997); see also infra
Part II.B.
5 A June 1995 poll for the Children's Coalition showed that 74% of voters agreed with
the statement that "political leaders are not doing enough to help solve the problems of
children." Kathleen Megan, Dole, Clinton Go for 'Children's Vote,' HARTFoRD CouRANT,
Sept. 16, 1996, at Al. According to a Children's Partnership poll, nearly two-thirds of
respondents said the government should play a large role in solving problems facing children.
See Melissa Healy, Race for Seats on the Baby Bandwagon, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1997, at
AlO. A January 1996 poll by the National Issues Convention sponsored by the University of
Texas at Austin revealed that 80% of voters believe that government should help with child
care issues. See Melissa Healy, Siowc Falls May Represent the Future of Motherhood, L.A.
Thm, June 17, 1996, at A12. In a recent Newsweek poll, 55% of parents surveyed stated
that they did not believe that existing policies of government and business were supportive of
families with young children. See What Matters Most: A Newsweek Poll, NEwswEEK,
Spring/Summer 1997 Special Edition, at 9.
61 use the term "liberal" to refer to the Anglo-American line of political thought
stretching from John Locke through John Stuart Mill and on to such contemporary thinkers as
John Rawls, whose work assumes the primacy of the individual and emphasizes respect for
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framework able to cognize and support parenting and the goods associated with
it.
Part II of this Article explores the limits of the law's current approach to
work-and-parenting issues. In it, I argue that the two legal frameworks used to
evaluate parenting issues-sex discrimination analysis under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA)S-assume a certain view of the world and what is important within it
that excludes important interests, needs, and aspirations implicated in
parenting. 9 In Part I, I argue that the law's limited vision of parenting derives
from our tradition of Western liberalism, the fundamentally individualistic
premises of which impede recognition of the goods associated with parenting
and the development of adequate frameworks for supporting parenting. In Part
IV, I contend that the liberal framing of the activity of parenting has become so
entrenched in the United States that it has even limited the terms of debate over
parenting in feminist legal theory, the area of theory in which current parenting
protections have been most thoroughly contested. Finally, in Part V, I propose
individual rights. This use of the term is therefore broader than the use of the term "liberal"
in common parlance to refer to those who hold political beliefs at the opposite end of the
political spectrum from conservatives. Under my use of the term, both thinkers such as
Rawls, who might qualify as liberal under common usage, and thinkers such as Robert
Nozick, who might be considered a political conservative, are "liberals."
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1994).
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. 1997).
9 Clearly the interests, needs, and aspirations of children, parents, and society, as well as
of employees are not monolithic. Moreover, what these needs and aspirations are, and who
gets to decide them, are political issues subject to interpretation and negotiation. C. NANCY
FRASER, Women Welfare, and the Politics of Need Interpretation, in UNRULY PRACnCEs:
POWER, DiscouRsE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 144-45 (1989). My
point here is that, however and whatever these needs and aspirations are interpreted to be, no
effort is made to include them within the existing legal framework.
Two insightful comparative scholars, Paolo Wright-Carozza and Mary Ann Glendon,
have performed the intellectual spadework for this first section by pointing out that Western
European countries provide greater protection to working parents, emphasize broader notions
of social equality, and have laws supporting parenting that evidence far more complex
normative concerns than the United States. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESrERN LAW (1987); Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal
Understandings of Work, Parenthood, and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81
CAL. L. REv. 531, 581 (1993). This Article seeks to answer the question posed by these
scholars-"Why does United States' law provide so much less support for parenting than
other countries?"-by developing a detailed account of the impediments that our public
philosophy poses to such protections and by attempting a reconstruction that would adequately
support parenting.
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a revision of the dominant liberal ideology to better support the diverse needs
and aspirations at stake in parenting and the goods that can be realized through
it.10 Such a revised vision, I contend, not only better conforms with the import
placed by Americans on how we, as a society, raise our children, and with
bedrock democratic values on which our society rests, but offers a more
productive vision for how we can and should live together.
In this discussion, I focus on America's dominant public philosophy of
liberalism, on law, and on feminist theory because each influences the bounds
of debate concerning work and parenting in our society. Liberalism constructs
our conception of the issues at stake; law expresses this philosophy in terms of
the institutional support that government will render; and feminist theory has
provided the chief source of contestation of the prevailing vision of parenting
depicted within the public philosophy and law. Insofar as none of these three
adequately considers the needs, aspirations, and goods associated with
parenting, it is not surprising that the society shaped by this conversation deals
poorly with work-and-parenting issues.
II. PARENTING AND THE LAW
Employees whose work and parenting responsibilities conflict generally
have two different avenues of legal protection: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,11 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.12 On their face, the two
statutes are very different: Title VII is concerned with eliminating employment
10 My proposal seeks protection for the parenting relationship rather than protection for
the family as an entity. Focusing on the parenting relationship has the advantage of, at least in
part, avoiding extremely difficult and contentious issues about how the term "family" should
be defined. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Rethinking the Fwnily, 20 PrIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS 77
(1991); Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities:
Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPAIA. 4 (1996). In
addition, focusing on the parenting relationship rather than the family as a collective entity
may require a smaller conceptual leap from the dominant liberal framework, which has great
difficulty conceptualizing group interests.
As I use it, the term "parenting" refers to carework by an adult within the scope of a
relationship that is primary to the child. My use of the term "parenting" therefore applies
more broadly than simply to those relationships in which the adult is legally considered a
parent; for example, it would apply to carework in the course of a relationship between a
foster parent and child. It is also compatible with carework that occurs in kinship structures in
cultures that diverge from the nuclear family pattern. See, e.g., CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR
KIN: STRA'TEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (1974).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1994).
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Spp. 1997).
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discrimination from the workplace, while the FMLA provides protection for
employees requiring time off work to attend to serious family needs. Yet both
share certain features: they are extremely limited in the protection they provide
working parents, they selectively focus on particular interests at stake in
parenting at the same time as they obscure others, and they share a particular,
narrow interpretation of what it means to parent.
A. Antidiscrimination Law as a Framework
In a society whose rhetoric is steeped in the value of families but which
remains ambivalent about the value of sexual equality, it is paradoxical that the
dominant legal framework through which the relation between parenting and
the workplace has been negotiated is sex discrimination law. Yet because until
passage of the FMLA in 1993 no other law provided protection for working
parents, and because of the limited scope of the FMLA since that time, 13 those
seeking protection for parenting activities have generally litigated their claims
under Title VII. That Act encompasses both a general prohibition on sex
discrimination in employment and an amendment, the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),14 which declares discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy or childbirth-related conditions to be sex discrimination. The
result of trying to fit the multiple needs and aspirations at stake in parenting into
the antidiscrimination framework constructed by Title VII and the PDA is like
the proverbial act of trying to fit a square peg into a round hole: in order to
make it fit, such a large portion of the peg needs to be pared away that it
becomes virtually unrecognizable.
1. Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual... because of... sex." 15 In order to fit parenting and work
conflicts into a form cognizable by the statute, the complex of needs,
aspirations, and goods at stake in parenting is pared down to two specific sets of
interests-those of the employer and those of the employee as an employee. In
this regard, Title VII applies only when the employee/parent's employment has
been or will be affected by parenting responsibilities, and then only if this
13 See infra Part II.B.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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conflict can be linked to sex discrimination. Title VII does not apply when the
employee/parent's parenting has been or will be affected by work
responsibilities. Hence, Title VII excludes from consideration the importance to
the employee of fulfilling child rearing responsibilities, raising well-balanced
children, and being part of a healthy, happy family. 16 Further, sex
discrimination law completely ignores the needs of the child in receiving
adequate parenting, the needs and aspirations of the family, and the interests of
communities in ensuring that their members are raised adequately. 17
Moreover, by virtue of its limited goal of eliminating discrimination in the
workplace, Title VII cannot ground any larger normative vision for the role of
parenting. Sex discrimination law provides only the same level of protection to
the act of parenting that it provides to other ways in which women may be
disadvantaged relative to men: if all women were miserable parents and simply
attended to work responsibilities while leaving their children unsupervised, the
conditions of the sex discrimination framework would be satisfied. In other
words, treating parenting within an antidiscrimination framework protects
parenting only insofar as it is necessary to avoid discrimination. It does not
support parenting because of the goods parenting makes available to parents,
children, and communities, including allowing children to become healthy,
competent people; parents to fulfill self-identified moral responsibilities to
parent; and communities to have a sound citizenry. The problem is not chiefly
that antidiscrimination law is failing to fulfill the function intended by Congress,
but that its function, by nature, is limited, and that no other framework exists
within United States' law that provides adequate protection to the broader
spectrum of interests at stake in work-and-parenting conflicts.18
16 See Wright-Carozza, supra note 9, at 579, 581 (contrasting the "formal equality of
unattached individuals within the workplace" in U.S. law with Italian law, in which "equality
never stands alone as an abstract concept. Rather, it always exists in relation to a person's
roles and activities: worker, parent, caring for children, developing through work,
participating in social life.").
17 See id. at 576-78.
18 Yet courts are also failing to fulfill even Title VII's limited potential to protect
parenting activities. Courts analyze Title VII challenges under two different frameworks of
analysis: disparate treatment doctrine, which prohibits practices motivated by discriminatory
intent, and disparate impact doctrine, which prohibits employment practices that are neutral
on their face but have a discriminatory effect in practice. See International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). Because courts have limited disparate
treatment analysis to situations in which women are treated differently from men with respect
to job requirements for which they are similarly situated, that doctrine is generally
inapplicable to policies that are applied equally to both sexes but that disadvantage working
mothers because of heavier parenting responsibilities. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
1998]
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2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Despite the clear link between parenting and women's inequality, 19 the
only place in which Title VII provides any explicit protection for parenting is in
the PDA. The PDA provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work."2 0 Even here, however, the enactment takes an extremely
narrow view of the interests at issue.
First, in keeping with the broader antidiscrimination framework of which it
is a part, the PDA pares down the issues at stake. It considers only the
employment interests of the pregnant employee by focusing on her ability or
inability to work. It does not consider the broader range of goods realized
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. 111. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988); Record v. Mill
Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. for the Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Barnes v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442 (D. Md. 1994).
Disparate impact doctrine, in prohibiting employment practices that have a
discriminatory effect on women, could in theory challenge job requirements that disadvantage
working parents based on the disadvantage they cause to women. Yet in practice, courts have
repeatedly refused challenges to such job requirements. See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp.,
118 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that disparate impact analysis was
inappropriately applied to plaintiffs claim that termination of part-time workers in the course
of reduction in force disadvantages working mothers; plaintiff failed to show that the
reduction in force was a "particular employment practice within the meaning of Title VII"
rather than "an isolated incident"); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that although policy denying women parental leave to breastfeed children "would
have an adverse impact upon young mothers wishing to nurse their babies for six
months .... that is not the kind of disparate impact that would invalidate the rule, for it
shows no less favorable treatment of women than of men"); see also Wallace v. Pyro Mining
Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (similar); Maganuco v. Leyden Community High
Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding disparate impact doctrine
inapplicable to maternity leave policy because plaintiff failed to present sufficient statistical
support); Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1183, 1191-92 (M.D. Ala. 1993)
(holding that hospital policy requiring pregnant and non-pregnant nurses to treat AIDS
patients does not violate disparate impact doctrine despite higher risks to pregnant women of
treating AIDS patients); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. at 1285 (holding disparate
impact doctrine inapplicable because plaintiffs failed to identify specific, facially neutral
policies that disadvantaged women).
19 See generally Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 79, 87-89 (1989) (discussing the economic impact of parenting responsibilities on
mothers).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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through parenting for the employee, children, and communities. Thus, in the
only portion of federal antidiscrimination law that explicitly considers issues
relating to parenting, the only feature of parenting deemed appropriate for legal
cognizance is the mother's ability or inability to work, rather than the goods
contributed by parenting to parents, children, and the community.
Second, the PDA protects only the medical aspects of pregnancy. A
pregnancy-related condition is limited to "incapacitating conditions for which
medical care or treatment is usual and normal." 21 All non-medical
circumstances that accompany pregnancy and childbirth are excluded from
consideration under the statute.22
Third, the PDA requires no accommodation for pregnancy and
childbearing unless such accommodations are made for other medical
conditions. The PDA therefore rejects the notion that the act of bringing
children into the world is an activity for which a greater level of protection or
support should be required than for medical conditions that lead to similar
levels of ability or disability to work. As the Supreme Court stated in Wimberly
v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission,23 under the PDA, "the State
cannot single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment, but it is not
compelled to afford preferential treatment."2 4
3. The Limits of Antidiscrimination Law
a. Limited Focus: Johnson Controls and Maganuco
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,25 highlights the
limitations of the antidiscrimination approach to work-and-parenting issues. In
21 Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869; see also Cooper v. Drexel Chem. Co., 949 F. Supp.
1275, 1279-80 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753
("[I]f a woman wants to stay home to take care of the child, no benefits must be paid because
this is not a medically determined condition related to pregnancy."); see also Piantanida v.
Wyman Center, Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n individual's choice to care
for a child is not a 'medical condition' related to childbirth or pregnancy .... An employer's
discrimination against an employee who has accepted this parental role.., is therefore not
based on the gender-specific biological functions of pregnancy and childbearing ...
23 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
24 Id. at 518; see also Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that PDA does not "require employers to offer maternity leave or take other
steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work") (citations omitted).
25 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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that case, employees of defendant Johnson Controls, a battery manufacturer,
challenged a company policy excluding all women from jobs involving actual
or potential exposure to lead, except those whose infertility was medically
documented. The company had instituted the policy to respond to the risks of
fetal hazards caused by lead exposure. Plaintiffs claimed that the policy violated
Title VII's prohibition on actions that discriminated based on sex. The
employer, in response, argued that although its exclusionary policy treated
women differently from men, the policy was lawful because it fell under Title
VII's bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception. That exception
permits employment practices that discriminate based on sex if they are
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise." 26
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the United States Supreme Court declared that
the BFOQ exception applied only to a worker's ability or inability to perform
the job in question, and could therefore not cognize possible harm to the fetus
from lead exposure. According to the Court: "[e]mployment late in pregnancy
often imposes risks on the unborn child.... but Congress indicated that the
employer may take into account only the woman's ability to get her job
done. "27 The interests of communities also cannot be cognized in this equation:
"No one can disregard the possibility of injury to future children; the BFOQ,
however, is not so broad that it transforms this deep social concern into an
essential element of battery making." 28 Moreover, the Court held, the "welfare
of the next generation" could play no part in assessing the lawfulness of this
policy.29 Having discarded this broader range of concerns from the statute's
consideration, the Court cast the issue in terms of parental autonomy, declaring
the employer's policy unlawful, because "[d]ecisions about the welfare of
future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and
raise them." 30
The needs, aspirations, and goods at stake in the intersection between work
and parenting are complex. They include, among others, parents' aspirations to
bear healthy children, the economic needs of workers and their families,
workers' interests in working in the job of their choosing, women's interest in
sex equality, the community's interest in healthy children, and the employer's
interest in an efficient workplace. Of this number of interests, the Court ruled
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
27 499 U.S. at 205 (citations omitted).
28 Id. at 203-04.
2 9 Id. at 206-07.
30 1d.
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that only the employers' interest in efficiency, and women's interests in
autonomy and sex equality were cognizable by Title VII.
The Court's failure to consider the broader range of concerns at stake
prevented consideration of alternatives that might accommodate this broader
range of concerns, including sex equality. Under the antidiscrimination
framework applied here, employers are required to allow women to stay in jobs
that pose fetal hazards so long as such jobs are open to men. Under a broader
framework, other solutions might have been required. For example,
consideration of parents' and society's interest in the well-being of present and
future children, in addition to sex equality interests, might have resulted in
requiring that the employer offer women and men who might bear children the
opportunity to transfer into safer jobs with equal pay and at least equivalent
working conditions.
Furthermore, the Court framed even the two interests it deemed cognizable
in contestable ways. First, in its refusal to consider harm to fetuses on the
ground that this might violate parental autonomy, the Court construed parental
autonomy as an interest that precluded legal involvement. It failed to recognize
that allowing individuals to determine the welfare of their children and future
children need not be inconsistent with legal support: if individuals decide that it
is not in their future children's interest to be exposed to lead, judicial insistence
that employers accommodate such decisions would further rather than hinder
parental autonomy.31 Instead, the Supreme Court's insistence that parents make
and act on determinations privately forces parents to make decisions from a
range of employment options that all may be unacceptable to them precisely
because these options are formulated without taking children's welfare into
account.32
311 do not address here the difficult issue of how the law should frame injuries to fetuses
who later become born children. A burgeoning literature attempts to deal with and to
reconceptualize the fetus's legal position in ways that do not infringe on women's autonomy.
See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing
Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1992); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist
Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1325 (1990) [hereinafter
Rethinking Motherhood]. I note here only that, under Johnson Controls, whether this harm is
conceived in terms of harm to communities' interests in healthy children, tle parents' interest
in healthy children, the interests of the fetus that is later born, or any combination of the
three, it cannot be cognized under employment discrimination law. In my view, insofar as the
interests of the fetus are conceptualized separately from the interests of the woman, in almost
all cases, the woman will be in the best position to determine the interests of the fetus and to
balance these interests against other relevant interests. See, e.g., id.
32 The importance of the issues excluded by the antidiscrimination framework is driven
home by the inane scope of the debate between the majority and the minority opinions in
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In addition, in limiting the antidiscrimination inquiry to securing women
equal terms and conditions of employment, the Court abstracted women's
interests in equal employment from the rest of their lives. The exclusion of
women's aspirations and responsibilities in bearing and rearing children
requires women to deal with these factors by leaving their jobs, if these factors
are to be considered at all. Thus, while Johnson Controls may in theory seem a
victory for women,33 when conceived in terms of women's lived reality, which
for many include aspirations and commitments involving childbearing and child
rearing, the Court's blinkered definition of women's interest in equality
ultimately perpetuates women's subordinate status in the workplace.
My point here is not to argue that Johnson Controls was wrongly decided
given the limited framework of inquiry provided by antidiscrimination law or
that sex equality concerns should not have weighed strongly-or even have
been the determinative factor34-in assessing the permissibility of the
company's policy.35 I argue here only that other interests should have been
accommodated in addition to the autonomy and sex equality interests, as they
Johnson Controls. Neither side disputed that the statute did not cognize harm to employees in
their roles of persons who might wish to bear children, to future children, or to communities
of which these injured children might one day be a part. Instead, the debate centered only on
whether the statute cognized financial harm to the employer from tort suits brought on behalf
of children injured by fetal hazards. See 499 U.S. at 208-11; id. at 213-15 (White, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 223-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment). Severe economic harm to an employer caused by a tort suit, the Court tells us,
may be cognizable under Title VII. Severe harm to fetuses, however conceptualized legally,
see supra note 31, that would later serve as the basis for such tort suits cannot be.
33 And, indeed, it has been hailed as a victory for women by a number of commentators.
See, e.g., Amy S. Cleghom, Justice Harty A. Blackm: A Retrospective Consideration of
the Justice's Role in the Emancipation of Women, 25 SEMN HALL L. REv. 1176, 1203-05
(1995); Renee I. Solomon, Future Fear: Prenatal Duties Imposed by Private Parties, 17 AM.
J.L. & MED. 411, 421-22 (1991); Sheryl Rosensky Miller, From the Inception to the
Aftermath of International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls: Achieving its Potential to
Advance Women's Employment Rights, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 227-78 (1993).
34 Indeed, plaintiffs presented compelling evidence of sex discrimination by
demonstrating that although the company excluded only women from positions involving lead
exposure, that exposure also posed a risk to the fetus through the father's sperm, a risk
against which the company's policy did not guard. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198,
221-22. Because of its narrow framework of consideration, the Court used this evidence to
justify allowing women in their childbearing years into jobs involving lead exposure, rather
than to seek alternatives that would prevent exposing men, women, and their possible future
children to lead exposure.
35 Neither do I contend that the company, rather than the government or women,
themselves, was the appropriate decisionmaker in developing fetal protection policies.
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were framed by the Court.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Maganuco v. Leyden
Community High School District 212,36 also demonstrates the manner in which
law pares down the issues at stake in the work-and-parenting context. In that
case, Rebecca Maganuco, a schoolteacher, presented a PDA challenge to a
leave policy that would not allow her to combine a period of paid sick leave and
unpaid maternity leave in order to take a year off from work following the birth
of her child. The collective bargaining agreement between the school and the
teachers provided for both kinds of leave, but required her to choose between
them. The Seventh Circuit rejected Maganuco's claim on the ground that the
PDA "is limited to policies which impact or treat medical conditions relating to
pregnancy and childbirth less favorably than other disabilities." 37 Because
Maganuco sought time off from work to parent, rather than solely as a result of
a physical disability relating to pregnancy and childbirth, the court held that her
claim was not cognizable under the PDA.
Maganuco demonstrates the disadvantage that the narrow focus of
antidiscrimination law can have not only for society and for children, but even
for the very interest that the scheme would seem most likely to protect-sex
equality. 38 By requiring parents to choose between the welfare of their children
and a job that is not required to take this welfare into account, in our gender-
structured society, it is generally women who leave the paid labor force in
order to ensure their children's well-being. 39
36 939 F.2d 440, 443-45 (7th Cir. 1991).
37Id. at444.
3 8 Indeed, as a number of feminist legal theorists have noted, it is only because the law
assumes a male standard for a worker that it could avoid requiring substantive protections for
the accommodation of parenting responsibilities: the law clearly assumes that others besides
workers (i.e., mothers) are taking care of children. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1559, 1597 (1991).
39 Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., 812 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1993), aff'd, 33 F.3d
1308 (11th Cir. 1994), also illustrates the way in which the Johnson Controls approach
redounds to the detriment of women. In that case, the court rejected a pregnant hospital
employee's claim that she should not be required to care for an AIDS patient due to the
increased exposure to infections that employees experienced in the treatment of AIDS
patients. The plaintiff contended that such exposure posed a greater risk to pregnant
employees than to non-pregnant employees. The court, relying on Johnson Controls, upheld
the employer's right to apply the policy to pregnant employees. According to the court,
Johnson Controls required employees, not employers or the court, to respond to fetal hazards:
"The [Supreme] Court held specifically that, in the context of action being taken by the
employer, it is the woman's decision to make as to whether or not to subject the fetus to
harm." Id. at 1191-92. In other words, pregnant employees may respond to fetal hazards by
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b. Interpretive Choices
Protection for parenting is not only limited by restrictions inherent in the
application of sex discrimination law to an area that implicates broader
concerns. Parenting protection is also limited by the manner in which courts
interpret the act of parenting. Chief among these interpretations is the judicial
construction of parenting activities as a "choice." In Barrash v. Bowen,4 the
Fourth Circuit expressed this interpretation through contrasting the (in its view,
justifiable) medical leaves for those "suffering extended incapacity from illness
or injury" to the (in its view, less justifiable) leaves for "young mothers wishing
to nurse their babies for six months."'41 Similarly, in Armstrong v. Flowers
Hospital,42 the court used the concept of choice to dismiss a challenge to the
termination of a pregnant nurse for her refusal to follow a policy requiring her
to care for patients with AIDS. Plaintiff sought to challenge the policy based on
the higher risks that such work might pose to pregnant women than other
employees. In the court's words, it was not the hospital's policy that caused the
plaintiff's termination but rather the "conscious decision of the plaintiff to
refuse to do her job."43 By the same token, the court in Maganuco construed
the plaintiffs challenge as "dependent not on the biological fact that pregnancy
and childbirth cause some period of disability, but on a... schoolteacher's
choice to forego returning to work in favor of spending time at home with her
newborn child."44 Courts then use this interpretation of parenting to deny legal
protection to women on the ground that they could have "chosen" not to parent
or, alternatively, could have "chosen" to parent in a manner that did not
hamper work responsibilities. In doing so, they restrict considerations of
children's welfare to private decisions by parents.
Refusing to accommodate parenting activities on the ground that parenting
is a "choice" begs a number of questions. In the first place, it does not consider
how the range of available options affects choice. As Justice O'Connor
recognized in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,45 the law orders both thinking and
quitting their jobs.
40 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988).
41 Id. at 931-32 (emphasis added).
42 812 F. Supp. at 1183.
43 Id. at 1191 (emphasis added).
44 Maganuco v. Leydon Community High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 444 (emphasis
added).
45 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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living through the choices it makes available to individuals. 46 In failing to
require that such considerations be considered by law, courts force parents to
decide between two unpalatable outcomes-their job and economic security for
their children versus the emotional security and, often, physical safety of their
children.
Moreover, using the parenting-as-choice interpretation to deny legal
support evades the question of whether, even accepting that interpretation,
society has some interest in and responsibility to children once parents have
"chosen" to bear them. The accident that befell Jessica McClure, the toddler
who fell down an abandoned well when she was playing in her aunt's backyard,
springs to mind. Dozens of rescue workers participated in her rescue as the
nation watched in concern. Failure to help because her parents "chose" to bear
her would have been unthinkable. Once born, she was a human to whom the
obligation to help was owed. Employment law, however, considers the
possibility of legal protection for parenting to be negated by the determination
that parents have "chosen" to bear a child.
Again the consequence of such an approach for sexual equality issues is
apparent. Joan Williams aptly summarizes the situation by stating that "[i]n the
work/family context, the rhetoric of choice masks a gender system that defines
childrearing and the accepted avenues of adult advancement as inconsistent and
then allocates the resulting costs of child rearing to mothers." 47 In this way, as
noted by Frances Olsen:
[a]ntidiscrimination law promotes market individualism and promises each
individual woman that she can win success in the market if only she chooses to
apply herself. It obscures for women the actual causes of their oppression and
treats discrimination against women as an irrational and capricious departure
from the normal objective operation of the market, instead of recognizing such
discrimination as a pervasive aspect of our dichotomized system 48
46 See id. at 855.
47 Williams, supra note 38, at 1596.
48 Frances E. Olsen, Fwnily and Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1552 (1983); cf Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under the Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1312-13 (1991). Professor MacKinnon states:
Social custom, pressure, exclusion from well-paying jobs, the structure of the
marketplace, and lack of adequate day care have exploited women's commitment to and
caring for children and relegated women to this pursuit which is not even considered an
occupation but an expression of the X chromosome. Women do not control the
circumstances under which they rear children, hence the impact of those conditions on
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The system is therefore both brilliant and ironic with respect to women. In
contrast to the past facial exclusions of women from the work world, women
are now supposedly free to work outside the home but are neither relieved of
the domestic responsibilities assigned them by social roles nor accommodated
with regard to these responsibilities at work. When women are forced to leave
work to accommodate these domestic responsibilities, they are deemed to have
made a "choice" and to have only themselves to blame. The ideology of choice
therefore privatizes and individualizes a system of subordination and then uses
the notion of consent to justify it.49
B. The Family and Medical Leave Act
The sole exception to the limited vision of parenting found in sex
discrimination law derives from the relatively newly passed Family and
Medical Leave Act and its state counterparts. Unlike antidiscrimination law, the
FMLA sets a solid floor beneath which positive protection for parenting may
not fall: covered employees are entitled to up to twelve weeks of aggregated
annual leave, after which their jobs Are guaranteed back to them. Moreover, the
prefatory language to the Act states that it seeks protection of a broader range
of interests than are cognized under Title VII. The preamble to the FMLA
recognizes the importance of the "development of children and the family
unit"; the needs of "fathers and mothers [to] be able to participate in early child
rearing" without being forced "to choose between job security and parenting;"
the national interest in preserving "family integrity;" and the goal of equal
opportunity for men and women.50
Yet the support to parenting actually afforded by the FMLA is minor. The
twelve weeks of leave that it allows constitutes only a fraction of the time
necessary to raise sound children. Moreover, the FMLA provides for no wage
replacement during that time. As a result, the majority of employees cannot
afford to make use of the leave.51 In addition, the statute applies only to
their own life chances.
Id.
49 Indeed, Carole Pateman argues that liberal theory idealizes contract-the epitome of
the legal embodiment of the ideal of choice-in order to justify relations of subordination. See
CAROLEPATEMviAN, TE SEXUAL CONTRACr 31-32, 39-76, 116-18, 154-56, 179-80 (1988).
50 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. 1997).
51 See Pat Swift, Lobbying for the Next Steps in Family Leave, BUFFALO NEVs, May
17, 1997, at C7 ("According to the Family Leave Commission, 64% of eligible employees
who needed family or medical leave stayed on the job because they could not afford to lose
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employees who work for companies with fifty or more employees. This
provision restricts coverage to only five percent of companies and forty percent
of the workforce. 52 The majority of private sector employees-roughly forty-
one million-are not protected.53 Finally, the FMLA confines the conditions of
leave to care for children to circumstances involving the birth or adoption of a
child, or to situations involving a severe medical emergency. Children who
need care at other times are, apparently, left to fend for themselves. As
pointedly stated by the court in Kelley v. Crosfield Catalysts:54
The Act clearly does not provide qualified leave for every family emergency.
A call from a police station or from school authorities, a minor ailment that
keeps a child home from school with no help immediately available, or a
personal crisis in the life of a child or a parent may cause a severe conflict for
an employee between work and family responsibilities. None is covered by the
FULA .... The legislative history makes it clear that the Act is intended to
reach four simations: to provide leave relating to the birth of a child or to the
adoption or initial foster care of a child by one not his or her parent, to care for
a seriously ill child, spouse, or parent, or to attend to the employee's own
serious health condition. The statute provides minimal protection in those
circumstances .... 55
Ironically, the protections accorded under the FMLA largely ignore the
broad interests discussed in the Act's preamble. In limiting the events eligible
for leave to the birth or adoption of a child or the serious illness of dependents,
and in confining its protection to a period of twelve weeks, the FMLA
generally protects periods involving the physical vulnerability of mother or
child. At bottom, the FMLA, like the PDA, is premised on a medical model
rather than one that protects a broader concept of parenting. The ease with
which employment law cognizes medical needs stands in sharp contrast with its
income.").
52 See Wright-Carozza, supra note 9, at 570.
53 See Swift, supra note 51, at 70.
54 962 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Il. 1997).
55 1d. at 1048; see also S. Rap. No. 103-3, at 28 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30 (stating that Congress sought to exempt "minor illnesses which last only
a few days and surgical procedures which typically do not require hospitalization and require
only a brief recovery period"); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.113 (1997) ("[L]eave to provide 'child care' would not ordinarily qualify as FMLA
leave if the child is not a newborn (in the first year of life after birth)."); Seidle v. Provident
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that a child's ear
infection is not a serious illness triggering mother's coverage by FMLA).
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treatment of other issues implicated in the parenting relationship.
The law here does not simply create a hierarchy of interests in which
medical needs are privileged over other interests; instead, it completely
disregards other needs, deeming medical needs the only ones worthy of legal
protection. 56 The FMLA takes no account of the fact that it requires far more
than twelve weeks to raise a child, that children need substantial amounts of
care, that most parents will be working during that time, and that the majority
of parenting will be performed under conditions not triggered by the medical
requirements of the FMLA. Thus, for most parents and almost all the time,
employers can require them to work long hours, to travel, and deny them
breaks to breast-feed children.
In summary, current protection for the act of parenting, insofar as
parenting conflicts with work requirements, is confined to two different
statutory enactments, neither of which provides support for important needs and
aspirations at stake in parenting or the goods that can be realized through
parenting. Under Title VII, parenting protections are forced into a sex
discrimination model that can cognize only the worker's interest in her job.
This model is individualistic, premised on voluntarism, and ignores the broader
implications of work-and-parenting issues. Under the FMLA, parenting
protections are forced into a medical model that cognizes serious medical needs
but not broader needs for care and affords legal protection only in crisis
situations.
IH. LBERAL THEORY AND PARENTING
What has prevented the development of a legal framework that can
adequately support the complex of needs and aspirations implicated in
parenting, despite the general public support for parenting protections? I argue
56 Ile model created a paternalistic system in which a physician, rather than the parent
or potential parent, defines the needs that are legally cognizable. See, e.g., Burnette v.
Vanguard Plastics, No. 95-1489-STR, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18808, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov.
22, 1996) (holding plaintiff's testimony that she could not perform job functions insufficient
because unsupported by medical evidence). In this regard, the statute adopts a similar
approach to that applied to abortion in the case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe,
the Supreme Court framed the issue of abortion as a medical decision to be determined
between a pregnant woman and her physician rather than in terms of a woman's own right to
choose. See id. at 153 (finding that pregnancy involves factors that "the woman and her
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation"). It is interesting that
paternalistic formulations were adopted in these two areas of law-parental leave and
abortion-both of which are perceived to be utilized by women. Both the Supreme Court and
Congress seem to suggest that women need assistance and supervision in decisionmaking.
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here that the answer derives in part from a particular view of the world that is
widely shared within the United States-by members of Congress responsible
for passing laws, by judges who interpret laws, by theorists who analyze them,
and by citizens who hold such beliefs even while they support broader
parenting policies. This world view is composed of a loosely related set of
beliefs that derive from, in Charles Taylor's words, "a family of theories of
liberalism that is now very popular, not to say dominant, in the English-
speaking world." 57
According to this world view, 58 society is composed of a collection of
discrete, autonomous individuals engaged in the pursuit of diverse, equally
acceptable plans of life. 59 The state's role in this scheme is to prevent incursions
on individuals' liberty to pursue their individual life plans, rather than to further
any particular vision of the good life.6° Under this view, individuals have no
obligations to one another unless they freely consent to them. Several features
of this account prevent the law from grasping and supporting the fundamentally
social and interdependent nature of parenting.
A. The Autonomous Individual
The conception of the individual that forms the core of liberal theory has
difficulty taking into account the fundamental levels at which persons are linked
57 Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitaim Debate, in LmERmsm
AND THE MORAL IaFE 159, 164 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989).
58 As Thomas Spragens insightfully argues, a depiction of liberalism such as the one
presented here divests liberalism of much of its richness and complexity by ignoring its
historical context. See Thomas A. Spragens, Sr., Communitarian Liberalism, in NEw
CoMMUNrrAmAN THmINKnG: PERSONS, VIRTUFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND CoMMuNms 37
(Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995). My description of contemporary liberalism does not contest
Spragens's historical account. Moreover, I present an oversimplified picture of the beliefs
held today. Clearly, there will be some variation with regard to beliefs-some individuals will
hold some but not all of these beliefs, others will hold none. Nevertheless, I believe that the
account presented in this article accurately captures a core of ideas held by the vast majority
of Americans, despite the fact that their own lives and some of their other beliefs may
contradict this liberal ideology.
59 See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFoRD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1987); see also LAURENCE H. TRmE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUrEs
(1990).
60 See, e.g., Ronald Dworldn, Liberalism, in PUBuc & PRIVATE MORArrY 112 (Stuart
Hampshire ed., 1978) (arguing that liberal society is one that embodies no particular views
regarding the ends of life; society, instead, is united around a procedural commitment to treat
people with equal respect).
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together. Liberal theory envisions an individual's identity as complete within
itself and as separate from both the identity and the interests of others. 61
Attachments and obligations, therefore, do not alter the essence of individual
identity. Instead, because liberal theory conceives of the individual as, in
Michael Sandel's word, "unencumbered," these attachments and obligations,
including to children, must be considered the product of choice (since
individuals, by definition, are autonomous and therefore must engage in such
relationships and assume such responsibilities only by their own free will).62
Thus, under liberal theory, relationships should be conceived of in the same
way and entitled to the same level of protection as other lifestyle choices made
by individuals.
This view of the autonomous individual cannot take account of -the
fundamental nature of the bond that many parents feel with their children. For
many, the parenting relationship is a constitutive part of their identity. 63 It
61 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY's DISCONTENT: AMmCA iN SEARCH OF A
PuBuc PHILOSOPHY 12 (1996).
62 Discussions of pregnancy vividly illustrate liberal theory's need to rest obligation to
others on "choice." Many opponents of abortion, although grounding their opposition on the
claim that the fetus is "a life," are still willing to permit abortions for victims of rape and
incest because these women did not "choose" to engage in the intercourse that led to their
pregnancy. Under the same rationale, theorists have asserted that pregnant women have
obligations to refrain from conduct harmful to the fetus based on their "choice" to carry a
fetus to term and not to obtain an abortion. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Chilabrth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 438 (1983)
("The mother has, if she conceives and chooses not to abort, a legal and moral duty to bring
the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possible."); id. ("Although she is under no
obligation to invite the fetus in or to allow it to remain, once she has done these things she
assumes obligations to the fetus that limit her freedom over her body."); see also Margery W.
Shaw, The Potential Plaintiff: Preconception and Prenatal Torts, in GEN=TCS AND THE LAW
II, at 225, 228 (Audrey Milunsky & George Annas eds., 1980) ("[Ounce a pregnant women
has abandoned her right to abort and has decided to carry her fetus to term, she incurs a
'conditional prospective liability' for negligent acts toward her fetus." (quoting Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853 (M. 1963))). Inthis way, liberal theory canjustify restraining a
pregnant woman's freedom while at least ostensibly maintaining the illusion of autonomy, the
prime justification of legitimacy in a liberal society. At the same time, alternative sources for
grounding obligation-for example, the dependence of the fetus on the woman-are not
considered.
63 While this is true for parents of both sexes, women, particularly, have defined
themselves in terms of their familial relationships. For example, Carole Pateman describes
how women factory workers in England see themselves as housewives even when they are at
work. Similarly, married women workers who ran a cooperative shoe factory still saw one
another "fundamentally... as wives and mothers." PATEMAN, supra note 49, at 141 (citing
JUDY WAJCMAN, WOMEN IN CONTROL: DILEMMAS OF A WORKERS' COOPERATvE 137-49,
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makes no sense to conceptualize these parents as individuals who are separate
from their ties: the welfare of their children is integrally and inseparably linked
with their own self-interest. For such mothers, conceiving of their interest in
equality in the workplace as separate from their interests in parenting and in the
welfare of their children distorts their view of the world by too narrowly
demarcating their interests. Further, treating parenting responsibilities as the
product of "choice" also distorts such parents' perception of these
responsibilities. For these parents, the activities connected with parenting are
not an expression of personal preference but rather are the fulfillment of a
responsibility that derives from their role as parent and their relationship with
their child.64
Further, the liberal conception of parenting as individual "choice" not only
misconstrues the way that many parents conceive of their parenting
responsibilities, it also detaches parenting from its social relevance. This
conception denies the ways in which the desire to bear children is affected by
social pressures. 65 It also obscures the way in which parenting is a public good
insofar as it contributes to the health of the polity of which children will one day
be citizens. By conceptualizing parenting as a matter of individual choice, the
liberal perspective fosters a sense that parenting is a private issue that requires a
private solution, rather than an issue appropriate for collective assistance.
In addition, the liberal emphasis on the autonomy of human beings
obscures the needs of children and the dependence that is inevitably a part of
the human condition.66 It is only through their dependence on adults that
154 (1983)).
64 According to Charles Taylor, moral issues involve "strong evaluation," by which he
means the exercise of judgment that stands independent of individual preferences. Taylor
points out that liberalism cannot separate what is good merely in the sense of satisfying an
existing preference from higher goods crucial to one's self-understanding as a healthy, moral
human being. See CHARMES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HuMAN SCIENcEs:
PmiLOSOPImCAL PAPERS 1 (1985).
65 See Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender
Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914, 931 (1987) (book review) ("What is the meaning of individual
choice and self-determination within a social fabric of human interdependence and interaction
where 'reality' and expectations are more often than not socially constructed?").
Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon takes issue with the view that the concept of "choice" can
be appropriately applied to childbearing in conditions of sexual inequality. She argues that the
term "choice" is misplaced in a world in which women's access to birth control and sex
education is restricted and in which sexual intercourse is to some degree not "free" because of
socialization to customs that define a woman's body as for sexual use by men. See
MacKinnon, supra note 48, at 1312.
66 Cultural feminists have made this point, although generally in the context of arguing
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children ultimately become adults who can at all be conceived of as
autonomous. As the conservative critic of Hobbes, William Lucy, wrote:
"Methinks that he discourses of Men as if they were terrigene, born out of the
earth, come up like Seeds, without any relation one to the other.... [By
nature, a human is] made a poor helpless Child who confides and trust in his
Parents, and submits to them." 67 In focusing on the importance of preserving
autonomy, liberal theory ignores the positive need humans have for care from
others. 68
From this liberal account of the individual follows the liberal emphasis on
individual rights. By conceiving of individuals as independent and autonomous,
rather than as related and requiring care, the primary danger to be avoided in
society is encroachment on individuals' autonomy. From this view derives a
conception of rights that attaches only to individuals rather than to collective
entities such as families or communities. Further, rights are conceived in terms
of protecting an individual from incursions by others rather than as, for
example, the right to care or to positive assistance in strengthening the
relationships between persons. In Mary Ann Glendon's words, the conception
that the "autonomy" framework represents a male outlook while the "connection" framework
represents a female outlook. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1 (1988). I here contend that the interdependence of humans-both men and
women-is a basic fact of human existence. In this, my position more closely conforms with
feminists who have written on issues of care and dependence without attempting to rely on
biological or developmental differences between the sexes. See, e.g., JoAN C. TRONTo,
MORAL BOUNDARiES: A PoLmcAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETmic OF CARE (1993); see also infra
notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
6 7 STEmPEN G. SALKEvER, FINDNG THE MEAN: THEORY AND PRACrICE iN
Aluro=AN PoLmcAL PHIuosoPHY 211 n.13 (1990) (citing JoYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY,
CArAUrsM AND A NEw SOciAL ORDER: Tm REPuBIUCAN VISION OF THE 1790s 20 (1984));
see also Susan Moiler Okin, Humanist Liberalism, in Lm 5m AND TEm MORAL LIFE 39,
41 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (stating that liberalism pays "remarkably little attention
to how we become the adults who form the subject matter of political theories").
681 use the term "care" here to refer to caretaking practices, or in Nancy Fraser's
terms, "carework," rather than to a feeling, disposition, or attitude, especially of the over-
sentimentalized sort to which the term "care" is often used to refer. See TRONTO, supra note
66; see also NANcY FRAsER, After the Family Wage, in JusTcC ITNTERRupTUS: CRmCAL
REFLE ONS ON THE "PoSTSOCIAL=" CoNDmON 52 (1997). Included within my usage are
those activities that contribute to raising emotionally stable, healthy children in this culture,
including feeding them, dressing them, reading to them, dusting them off and comforting
them when they hurt themselves, and putting them to bed. Not included is the emotional
response one may have to seeing pictures of starving children in a magazine, or by the same
token, the feeling of affection one may have for one's children, although this emotion may
accompany or serve as an incentive for the performance of caretaking activities.
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of rights as merely delineating zones of autonomy results in a "near aphasia"
regarding the way that the law might aid individuals in meeting their
responsibilities to other individuals and in leading full, dignified lives. 69 Under
this tradition, children's dependence is recognized only insofar as parents have
the "right" to control them; children therefore are viewed as extensions of the
adult liberal individual.70 We have far less difficulty conceiving of children as
falling within a parent's personal sphere of autonomy-and thus allowing
parents the right to be free of interference in order to raise and school children
as they see fit-than of recognizing how the state can actively support parents in
caring for children.
The gendered nature of this depiction of the individual has been the
frequent subject of feminist commentary. Feminist theorists have noted, in
Susan Okin's words:
that claims that the subjects of classic liberal theory are autonomous, basically
equal, unattached rational individuals-in Hobbes's words "men as if but even
now sprung out of the earth... like mushrooms"-rest on the often unstated
assumption of women's unpaid reproductive and domestic work, their
dependence and subordination within the family, and their exclusion from most
spheres of life. With women's status left ambiguous and the family assumed
but not discussed, contemporary liberal theory has yet to take account of the
fact that men are not mushrooms.7
Feminist theorists have also recognized that liberal theory's conception of
obligation as solely voluntary rests on a gendered view of the world.
Communities have survived and flourished only because women attended to
69 See Mary Ann Glendon, RIGHTS TALK: THE I MSHMENT OF PoLrnCAL
DiscouRsE 109 (1991). In addition, Lucinda Finley stresses the importance of
"[i]ncorporating the [i]deal of [r]esponsibilities" into the legal discourse over conflicts
between parenting and workplace in the United States. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workqlace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
1118, 1171 (1986).
70 _. Michelle Barrett & Mary McIntosh, TnE ANTI-SocIAL FAMILY 48, 50 (1982)
(arguing that children are treated as a "private possession" in liberal thought).
This strong strand in liberal thought is embodied in recent attempts in more than half of
all states to amend state constitutions in order to incorporate a "Parental Rights Amendment"
that gives parents the inalienable right "to direct and control the upbringing, education,
values, and discipline of their children." Karen Brandon, Parents Ask: Who Controls Our
Kids? Colorado Proposal Fuels Rights Debate, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996, at 1.
71 Okin, supra note 67, at 41; see also WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 149 (1995)
(noting that liberal depiction of the individual reflects the masculinization of the male subject
cut loose from the family).
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relationships and family responsibilities at a far more fundamental level than is
accounted for by liberal conceptions of choice and the free pursuit of ends.
Within almost all sexual divisions of labor in history, women have been
encumbered by the bonds of necessity and have been bound to relationships
they are assigned to tend.72 In Nancy Hirschmann's words, "[t]he exaggerated
emphasis on consent as the only legitimate way to establish relationships of
obligation, and the assumption of innate human separateness on which it is
based, reveal a masculinist conceptualization of the self, of 'individuals,' that
runs contrary to women's historical experience and epistemology." 73
B. Parenting as a Private Issue
The demarcation drawn in the liberal tradition between the public and
private realms also impedes legal support for parenting. Two distinct aspects of
this dichotomy hinder protection of parenting in the employment context.
First, the realm of work is frequently seen as "public" in contrast to the
"private" domestic realm. The activities associated with each sphere are then
considered properly confined to that sphere. Activities such as child care that
are associated with the private realm are in this view bracketed from
consideration in the public realm of work. For this reason, while the workplace
is considered an appropriate place for some social policies, including those that
protect the welfare of workers by requiring employers to pay into the workers'
compensation and unemployment compensation systems, laws providing for
leave due to pregnancy, childbearing, or child rearing are seen as inappropriate
"social engineering." 74 This ideology forces parenting issues out of the
72 See BROWN, supra note 71, at 154.
7 3 Nancy j. Hirschmann, Obligation: Rethinking Obligation for FemiSnsm, in
REvmioNiNG TnE POUrICAL 162 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di Stefano eds., 1996).
As Virginia Held frames the issue: "To see contractual relations between self-interested or
mutually interested individuals as constituting a paradigm of human relations is to take a
certain historically specific conception of 'economic man' as representative of humanity. And
it is, many feminists are beginning to agree, to overlook or to discount in very fundamental
ways the experience of women." Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF
INTEREST 288 (Jayne Mansbridge ed., 1990). Joan Williams makes a similar point in noting
that men could only conceive of themselves as having the capacity for free choice because
they assigned caretaking responsibilities to women. See Williams, supra note 38, at 1596-
1608.
74 Martin Kasindorf, Campaign '96: With Velvet Gloves: Gore, Kemp Trade Polite Jabs
on Taxes, Abortion, Cities, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1996, at A5 (quoting Jack Kemp on family
leave); see generally FRAsER, supra note 68, at 168. As Lucinda Finley notes, "[tihe problem
is that the spheres of work and family have been viewed as separate in a way that has
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workplace and the economic realm, makes parenting inconsistent with many
full-time jobs, and therefore displaces parenting issues that cannot be
accommodated within the domestic realm into the social services realm, where
such protections are considered to be "charity" rather than a matter of right.
Because care is considered a private activity, it is deemed inappropriate in the
work world. It is only in the private realm of the family that the concept of care
is valorized. 75
The implications for women's equality of this public/private dichotomy
have been explored by a number of feminist writers. 76 They note that not only
are certain activities and qualities traditionally associated with women located
within the private realm, but that women, themselves, have been and to a
considerable extent continue to be associated with this sphere. Indeed, the
maintenance of this dichotomy depends on a gendered structure of society-the
public world can exclude the domestic and embrace the concept of freedom
only because women are left in the private realm to focus on necessities such as
rearing children.77 Because of this formulation, those women who do enter civil
society must do so on socially "male" terms as liberal subjects who can
separate themselves from the demands of the private realm.78 The task is often
an impossible one for women, insofar as these demands can be confined to the
domestic realm only if women stay there in order to meet them.
A second aspect of the liberal demarcation between "public" and "private"
also impinges on support for working parents. In this conception, while the
workplace is public when defined against the domestic realm,.it is private when
contrasted with the public realm of government. While the first aspect of the
excluded the values, needs, and perspectives of one from recognition in the other." Finley,
supra note 69, at 1171.
75 In Joan Tronto's words: "Care has little status in our society, except when it is
honored in its emotional and private forms." TRoNTo, supra note 66, at 122.
Katharine Silbaugh makes the related point that housework's association with the
domestic realm and that realm's perceived affectionate atmosphere, causes housework to be
perceived as not "really work" and therefore not accorded the benefits and protections
accorded to wage labor. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and
the Law, 91 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1996).76 See, e.g., PATEMAN, supra note 49; Williams, supra note 38; Olsen, supra note 48;
Finley, supra note 69.
77 Carole Pateman argues that the very founding of the modem liberal state required the
construction of a civil society in contradistinction to the private sphere. The creation of this
dichotomy allowed construction of the liberal formulation of free and equal men in civil
society at the same time as it relocated men's patriarchal right over women to the private
domain and deemed it natural rather than political. See PATEMAN, supra note 49.
78 See BRowN, supra note 71, at 184.
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public/private dichotomy holds that the workplace should not accommodate
parenting responsibilities because these responsibilities are private, the second
view then allows workplace policies that fail to accommodate parenting to
appear nonpolitical, as merely the private, individual decisions of employers.
Nancy Fraser's analysis of this issue is persuasive:
In male-dominated, capitalist societies, what is "political" is normally defined
contrastively over against what is "economic" and what is "domestic" or
"personal." Here, then, we can identify two principal sets of institutions that
depoliticize social discourses: they are, first, domestic institutions, especially
the normative domestic form, namely, the modem restricted male-headed
nuclear family; and, second, official economic capitalist system institutions,
especially paid workplaces, markets, credit mechanisms and "private"
enterprises and corporations 79
Thus, in the area in which work-and-parenting issues intersect, parenting issues
are, first, bracketed as domestic and therefore inappropriate for intervention in
the work sphere and, second, bracketed as altogether nonpolitical because they
intersect with the economic system.
C. The Neutral State
The liberal conception of the state as neutral regarding individual life plans
also poses an obstacle to the development of legal support for parenting. This
conception of the state's role derives from the liberal conception of the
autonomous individual: in its view, in order to respect the dignity of the
person's free and independent self and the choices that liberal theory esteems so
highly, government neutrality is required. 80 As Justice O'Connor expressed this
doctrine in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: "At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
79 FRASER, supra note 9, at 168; see also Olsen, supra note 48, at 1501 (distinguishing
market and family dichotomy from state and civil society dichotomy).
80 See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 62-63. Interestingly, the view that the government
should be neutral on questions of the good life appears to weaken once one moves outside of
the framework of legal rights, narrowly construed. Government encouragement of particular
activities through U.S. tax policy, for example, is often considered far more acceptable than
adoption of laws favoring these activities. Thus, in the 1996 vice-presidential debates, Jack
Kemp opposed the Clinton administration's proposal to institute broader family protections on
the ground that granting family leave rights to parents violated government neutrality: "That
isn't America, that's social engineering." Kasindorf, supra note 74, at A5. In its place,
however, Kemp proposed a tax break to support families.
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mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the state."81
The law, in this view, simply provides a neutral framework of rights, defined as
fair procedures, in which individuals can choose their own valued ends.82 It
neither imposes a substantive vision of the good life nor privileges some
versions of the good life over others. 83
Two, sometimes competing, values are given overwhelming preeminence
in this rights framework: liberty and equality. While liberty undoubtedly has
pride of place in the hierarchy of liberal values, equality is the other highly
esteemed value in this tradition. 84 In contemporary liberalism, the tension
between these two values is expressed by the divide between two camps of
liberals: libertarians who emphasize liberty and egalitarians who stress equality.
Both, however, share an individualistic, rights-oriented approach that eschews
normative complexity in favor of a focus on these dominant values.85 Within
this culture, state intervention is justified on liberty or equality grounds, or not
at all.
This conception of the government simply as a neutral arbiter of rights
makes it far easier to place parenting issues in a framework that pits women's
rights to equality against the autonomy of employers than to consider the broad
range of interests at stake in parenting. Within this liberal framework, the law
then converts equality into a narrow guarantee of the right to fair procedures for
individual women rather than to a particular end-state: freedom from
discrimination is guaranteed, a workplace in which men and women share
power equally is not.8 6 Under this conception of government neutrality, the
81 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
82 See id. at 850 ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code."); SAN-EL, supra note 61, at 63-64.
83 Catharine MacKinnon points out the way in which this doctrine maintains the
subordination of women and other disadvantaged groups. The conception of neutrality, she
argues, in excluding the state's substantive involvement in civil society,
has meant that civil society, the domain in which women are distinctively subordinated
and deprived of power, has been placed beyond reach of legal guarantees. Women are
oppressed socially, prior to law, without express state acts, often in intimate contexts.
The negative state cannot address their situation in any but an equal society-the one in
which it is needed least.
CAmnI-t.m A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 165 (1989).
84 See Spragens, supra note 58, at 42.
85 See id. at 44.
86 See Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 n.5, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982)
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issue of how work could be structured to best realize goods besides liberty and
equality, such as to promote workers who lead full lives as moral persons and
parent healthy, happy children, is not open for consideration. By the same
token, the issues of what government policies could best promote community
and further the interests of communities are also off-limits.
The obstacle that the liberal conception of state neutrality poses to support
for parenting is compounded by a more recent development in liberal thought.
That development conceives of the state stepping outside its role of neutral
arbiter as a threat not simply because it constrains the liberty of individuals, but
because it creates conditions of dependence. Popular thought increasingly
counterposes the liberal adulation of individual autonomy against the threat of
dependence, which is conceived broadly in terms of receiving any type of
public support. 87 Autonomy, in this view, stands as the ideal against which
dependence is negatively compared. Public support can therefore be justified as
a necessary evil only when the perceived "normal" state of autonomy has
broken down, and then only until the crisis can be overcome. 88 The dichotomy
drawn between autonomy and dependence (viewed in terms of public support)
limits state support for parenting to conditions of crisis (defined primarily in
economic terms). It therefore forecloses examination of the goods that might be
("Title VII does not ultimately focus on ideal social distributions of persons of various races
and both sexes. Instead it is concerned with combating culpable discrimination."); id. at 1277
(Title VII "tolerates a disparate impact on racial minorities so long as that impact is only an
incidental product of criteria that genuinely predict or significantly correlate with successful
job performance, and does not result from criteria that make race a factor in employment
decisions.").
87 The recent welfare debates are a case in point. It should be noted, however, that
support for the middle-class and wealthy, including homeowner mortgage interest deductions,
social security, and support for particular industries are defined in the popular mind in a
manner that does not raise the risk of dependency.
Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon discuss changes in the concept of "dependence" in the
United States in A Genealogy of 'Dependency. Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,
in JusnCE INTERRUPTUs, supra note 68, at 121-49.
88 In arguing for a family policy in which the "public household" is considered an
integral support to the private household, Michele Moody-Adams disputes the prevailing view
of the American family as historically self-reliant. She points to the work of Stephanie
Coontz, who "compellingly argues that the family types commonly celebrated as ideals of
American economic self-reliance-the nineteenth-century frontier family and the suburban
family of the 1950s-may have been more heavily subsidized by government programs than
any other families in American history." Michele Moody-Adams, The Social Construction
and Reconstruction of Care, in SEX, PREFERENCE, & FAMILY, supra note 2, at 5 (citing
Stephanie Coontz, THE WAY WE NEvER WERE: AMERICAN FAMIES AND THE NoSrALGIA
TRAP (1992)).
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realized through public support of parenting in the ordinary course of the lives
of parents and children.
D. Summary
In summary, several elements of liberal ideology work together to hinder
support for parenting. The conception of individuals as autonomous and
existing prior to freely chosen obligations and relationships obscures the way in
which individuals can be defined by their relationships with others,
misconceives conditions of dependency and the need for care, and prevents
recognition that individuals may need more support to realize their goals than
simply the right to be left alone. The liberal demarcation between the public
and private realms legitimizes the view that parenting responsibilities have no
place in the realm of work and that government has no business instituting
family policies in the employment realm. The conception of the state as simply
a neutral arbiter of rights impedes the state from actively supporting parenting.
Finally, the liberal tradition's emphasis on liberty and autonomy obscures the
more complex range of goods associated with parenting.
The current legal treatment of the intersection between work and parenting
mirrors this liberal philosophy. Title VII replicates liberal theory in framing
work-and-parenting issues solely in terms of the right of employers to conduct
their business freely and the interests in equality of female employees,
conceived apart from relationships with children. In keeping with the liberal
view of the state as enforcing the right to fair procedures, the law then
construes the employee's interest in equality as the right to be free from sex
discrimination, rather than the right to substantive equality. In doing so, it
precludes consideration of ways in which the law might affirmatively support
parenting responsibilities. The employee's commitment to fulfill parenting
responsibilities remains uncomprehended and unprotected in this analysis.
Similarly, the needs of children and the benefits to the community realized
through parenting go unrecognized. Child rearing, in this view, is conceived
solely in voluntarist terms and is valued only as another lifestyle choice. 89
While employees are allowed the right to choose to bear and rear children, they
are not supported in securing the conditions that will enable them to combine a
productive work life with the bearing and rearing of these children.90
89 See generally SANDEL, supra note 61, at 108.
90 Paolo Wright-Carozza notes that Article 3 of Italy's Constitution contains a much
broader conception of the ends furthered by law:
It is the task of the Republic to remove the obstacles of an economic and social nature
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Under the FMLA, liberal philosophy limits protection for parenting to
crisis situations. In keeping with liberalism's de-emphasis of interdependence,
its recognition of the need for care is so grudging that it occurs only at the
margins, in situations in which a concrete, tangible need can be verified by a
health care professional. The less measurable needs of children-the need to
feed them, supervise them, love them, teach them-are invisible under these
standards.
IV. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
During the course of the last twenty years, feminist legal theory has been
one of the critical movements that has most thoroughly and effectively
challenged the underpinnings of law and legal theory. It is from this critical
perspective that most theoretical treatments of parenting leave have come. Yet,
even feminist legal theory has generally not sought to analyze conflicts between
work and parenting responsibilities in terms of the broad range of needs and
aspirations at issue. Instead, feminist theory, too, has largely accepted the
dominant framework's limited focus and has analyzed this issue solely in terms
of achieving equality for women in the workplace. It has not often considered
these issues in terms of how women (and men) seek to shape their lives outside
of the workplace both as parents and as people, except instrumentally, in order
to secure women's equality within the workplace. In addition, the needs of
children and communities have generally been absent from feminist
perspectives.
Feminist legal theory concerning the intersection between parenting and the
workplace has focused on the issue of how employment law should respond to
pregnancy, childbearing, and child rearing. As this debate emerged in the
1970s and early 1980s, participants could be roughly classified into two
camps.91 In the first camp fell "equal treatment" proponents, who argued that
the best legal strategy for women to achieve equality is to apply the same
that, by substantively limiting citizens' liberty and equality, impede the full development
of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political,
economic and social organization of the country.
Wright-Carozza, supra note 9, at 537.
91 The standard disclaimer here: I use these categories as a heuristic device to aid the
reader. I do not mean them to indicate that the distinctions I make reflect sharp divisions
between the various groups, that positions within these groups are monolithic, or that no
writers have a foot in two camps or, alternatively, no camps.
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standard to them that has been applied to men. 92 This position would support,
for example, allowing women parenting leaves only when such parenting leaves
were allowed to men; it would not require that parenting leaves be provided
either to women or men. In the second camp fell advocates of "special
treatment," who maintained that women should receive special accommodation
in the workplace for specific differences (often confined to biological
differences) that disadvantaged them in relation to men.93 This position would
support, for example, providing maternity leaves to women even when no
comparable paternity leaves were offered to men.
By the mid-to-late 1980s, the terrain of the debate had evolved into its
current form. By that time, equal-treatment feminists had generally conceded
that certain basic changes in the workplace were required to achieve equality
for women, although they still contended that such changes should be made in a
sex-neutral manner. 94 In the meantime, the special-treatment position had been
transformed into a position that has been dubbed "cultural feminism," which
celebrates values and outlooks associated with women, such as nurturing,
building, and preserving relationships. 95 Moreover, the debate was also joined
92 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985); The
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WoMEN's RTS. L.
REP. 175 (1982).
93 See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy:
Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 513 (1983).
94 See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Wendy W. Williams, Will Equality Require More Than
Assimilation, Accommodation, or Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37
RuTGERs L. REv. 825 (1985).
95 Carol Gilligan's pathbreaking book, IN A DFFERENT VoicE (1982), in which she
associates women more than men with a type of moral thinking focused more on
relationships, serves as the foundation for much cultural feminism. Nancy Chodorow's study,
THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PsYcHoANALYsIs AND THE SocioLOGY OF GENDER
(1978), which links differences between men and women's personalities with the differences
in the allocation of child care responsibilities between the sexes, has also served as an
important work for cultural feminists. For examples of cultural feminism, see Leslie Bender,
Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 TuLsA L.J. 759 (1990); Kenneth K. Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J. 447 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculation on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985);
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 543 (1986); West, supra note 66.
However, advocates of special treatment remain who do not fall into the cultural feminist
camp. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994).
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by a third, radical feminist, position. According to this view, focusing the
debate on whether women should be treated similarly or differently to men
ignores the real cause of women's oppression-power disparities between men
and women.96 The relevant question for litigation in this third view is whether
workplace practices regarding family responsibilities maintain women's
deprived power status. 97
The literature surrounding work-and-parenting issues seeks legal protection
for working mothers based on the goal of achieving equality for women. In
doing so, feminist theory has been the predominant voice in contesting liberal
theory's assumption that equality can be conceived or furthered without
considering women's parenting responsibilities. Nevertheless, the debate in
feminist theory has not contested fundamental ways in which liberal theory has
framed parenting issues. Like liberal theory, feminist legal theory has framed
work-and-parenting issues in terms of a battle between the employer's
autonomy and the employee's equality without recognizing the complex of
values at stake. The interests of men, children, and communities generally are
taken into account in constructing these protections only insofar as necessary to
ensure women's equality. Feminist legal theory therefore accepts the liberal
view that liberty and equality mark the limits of the positive vision of society
that the state can appropriately support.98 To boot, like the capitalism that
accompanies liberalism, feminist legal theory has tended to limit its conception
96 See, e.g., CAnARiE A. MAcKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination, in FEmInsm UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsns ON LiE AND LAw 32, 34 (1987).
97 See id.
98 A few exceptions exist to the limitations of this debate. The most notable occurs in a
recent article published by Ruth Colker. See Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and
Capitalism, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 61 (1997). In it, Colker points out that discourse regarding
pregnancy-based discrimination in the United States "virtually ignores the needs and interests
of young children." Id. at 64. In addition, Lucinda Finley, in the context of a discussion on
the shortcomings of the "difference debate," makes the point that current legal policies that
apply to parenting fail to consider the essential interconnectedness of human existence. See
Finley, supra note 69, at 1142. In addition, several articles by Nancy Dowd approach work
and family issues from a wider perspective. See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single
Parents, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1995); Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing
Family: A Blueprint for Family Leave, 30 HARv. J. LEGMs. 335 (1993); Nancy E. Dowd,
Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 AmIZ. L. Rnv. 431 (1990). In contrast to
this Article's approach to reconceptualizing legal protections by focusing on the parenting
relationship and visions of a good soci&y, Dowd seeks to reconceptualize the definition of
family in order to support diverse family forms, to include family work in definitions of
work, and to guarantee an economic floor to all families.
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of equality to economic equality. 99
Further, feminist legal theory has generally failed to focus on the needs of
children any more than necessary to secure women's equality. In doing so,
feminist theory, like liberal theory, undervalues the connection that many
mothers feel to their children. For these mothers, economic equality is only one
of a number of reasons that work-and-parenting protections should be
implemented. Chief among the others is the need of their children for parenting
and these mothers' commitment to parenting. Failing to give weight to
parenting protections because they help fulfill children's needs and mothers'
commitments misses a key part of the views of these women.l°°
99 Nancy Fraser dubs "the vision implicit in the current political practice of most U.S.
feminists" "the Universal Breadwinner." FRASER, supra note 68, at 51. As she describes it:
"The point is to enable women to support themselves and their families through their own
wage-earning. The breadwinner role is to be universalized, in sum, so that women, too, can
be citizen-workers." Id. She contrasts this vision with the vision she advocates, the
"Universal Caregiver" model, which seeks to "induce men to become more like most women
are now, namely, people who do primary carework." Id. at 60. Fraser bases her argument for
the "Universal Caregiver" model on the inadequacy of the "Universal Breadwinner" model to
achieve equality for women because it holds women to the same standard as men without
enabling them fully to meet this standard. In her view, the "Universal Caregiver" model deals
better with gender equality concerns. The model Fraser advocates, in seeking to encourage
men as well as women to perform primary carework, conforms with the proposal made in
this Article. I seek to justify this vision, however, based on a broader range of goods than
Fraser, who confines her goal to achieving gender equality.
Cf. BROWN, supra note 71, at 10 ("[A]s the Right promulgated an increasingly narrow
and predominantly economic formulation of freedom and claimed freedom's ground as its
own, liberals and leftists lined up behind an equally narrow and predominantly economic
formulation of equality."); Silbaugh, supra note 75, at 5-6 (noting that most feminist
discussions of women's unpaid labor "implicitly assume that wage labor market participation
ought to be the goal for feminist legal reform").
10 This truncated view of women's interests contrasts dramatically with the description
of the political views of mothers conveyed by Susan Carroll, of the Women and Politics
Research Center at Rutgers University. According to Carroll, "these women approach issues
through the lens of their children and families." Michelle Dally Johnston, Parfies Don't Know
Real 'Soccer Moms', DENVERPOST, Oct. 13, 1996, atAl.
The attempt to separate sex equality from other concerns important to the lived
experience of women is what prompted the comment by a professional woman to Anna
Quindlen that "the women's movement had been the guiding force in her life until she had
children, and then she'd felt abandoned by feminist rhetoric and concerns." Anna Quindlen,
Let's Anita Hill This, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1993, § 4, at 15. In Quindlen's words,
feminism's failure to address the importance of children to the lived experience of many-
women has resulted in "a generation of educated young women who heard a great deal about
the glass ceiling but little about the silken chains of mother love." Id.
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The work of Joan Williams, a feminist theorist who has written extensively
on work-and-parenting issues, demonstrates the limits of the current debate in
feminist theory. In Deconstructing Gender,101  Williams advocates a
combination of the revised equal-treatment and radical feminist positions: 102 she
focuses on power relations as the cause of women's subordination while at the
same time advocating a gender-blind restructuring of the workplace. In the
process, she criticizes cultural feminism as marginalizing women through
falsely stereotyping all women as possessing traits associated with femininity
and through inappropriately celebrating their exclusion from the workplace in
order to accommodate domestic duties. In making this argument, Williams
focuses on the issue of the workplace's failure to accommodate parenting solely
in terms of the disadvantage it causes to women as an economic matter.
While her analysis of the way in which workplace structures marginalize
women with family responsibilities is compelling, it is also incomplete.
Williams, like the law, pares down the issues at stake. She fails to consider the
way in which these structures limit a woman's ability to parent. Neither does
she consider the extent to which parenting is and should be a fundamental part
of many mothers' (and fathers') identities, except to consider this a source of
women's subordination. In addition, the issue of the adequacy of the care given
children in her proposal is never considered. Under this analysis, the workplace
should be adjusted to the needs of working parents solely to achieve sex
equality. Enabling parents to parent, children to flourish, and communities to
prosper plays no role in this scheme. 103
101 Joan Williams, Deconstrcting Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
102 In later works, Williams renounces her support for equal treatment feminism in favor
of postmodemism's celebration of difference. See Joan Williams, Sameness Feminism and the
Work/Family Conflict, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rxv. 347 (1990); Joan Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and
Critical Race Theory, 1991 DuKE L.J. 296 (1991).
103 In a later article, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, supra
note 38, Williams again considers work-and-parenting conflicts. As in Deconstructing
Gender, her analysis isolates the gender equality interests from the other issues at stake in the
intersection between work and family, except for noting that workplace structures that
marginalize women can also cause children to suffer. In the closing pages of her article,
however, Williams moves toward a more complete recognition of the complex of interests at
stake in the intersection of work and family. There she proposes that feminism should seek to
"imagine new worlds in which individual women do not feel trapped, in which children's
needs are not pitted against adults' plans for self-development, but rather are viewed as
central to our mission as a society." Id. at 1633. To do so, she recognizes, will require "more
attention to affiliative and communal needs than the traditional liberal model suggests." Id. at
1634. Yet, except for these brief mentions in the concluding section of her article, Williams
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The clear exception to the position that I have been describing in the
feminist legal theory debate over parenting is that of cultural feminists. In
contrast to other positions within the debate, cultural feminists have paid careful
attention to women's relationships to their children and have argued for
government support to foster these relationships. For example, Robin West, in
an essay that argues that jurisprudence should be transformed to accommodate
virtues associated with women, states that:
[w]e need to show... that a legal and economic system which values, protects
and rewards nurturant labor in private life will make for a better community.
We need to show that community, nurturance, responsibility, and the ethic of
care are values at least as worthy of protection as autonomy, self-reliance, and
individualism. We must do that, in part, by showing how those values have
affected and enriched our own lives104
Cultural feminism, however, while not succumbing to the limitations of
liberal assumptions, presents its own set of difficulties that undermines its
alternative framing of work and family issues. First, cultural feminism
overlooks differences between individual women and between different social
groups of women by placing women as a group in a more privileged position
than men with respect to relational qualities such as nurturing and caring. 105
Second, insofar as cultural feminism assigns women a privileged position with
respect to qualities that have been associated with them under conditions of
subordination, it risks reifying the association between women and these
qualities. In other words, by placing women in a fundamentally different
position than men with respect to the liberal connection/autonomy dichotomy,
cultural feminism risks reaffirming the dichotomies of liberal discourse rather
than overthrowing them to move toward a world in which interconnection is the
norm for both men and women. As a consequence, it risks entrenching
women's subordination by reinforcing the link between them and qualities
marginalized in current liberal discourse.106
never develops this provocative vision.
104 West, supra note 66, at 65-66.
105 In addition, cultural feminists often base such claims on questionable ontological
premises. For example, West unconvincingly found women's orientation of connection to
others in part on their experience of menstruation and intercourse. Id. at 2-3; see also
Williams, supra note 101, at 800-01 n.11 (criticizing West's analysis of the causes of
women's differences from men).
106 See BROWN, supra note 71. Joan Williams critiques this difficulty with cultural
feminism in detail in Deconstrucdng Gender, supra note 101, at 806-22. While I agree with
many of the insights of her critique, in my view, Williams fails to preserve the positive
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Third, cultural feminism, by unqualifiedly celebrating traits associated with
women, risks celebrating traits that are wholly a product of women's
oppression and would be dysfunctional in a society composed of men and
women who share power equally. Nancy Fraser refers to such traits as those
differences that are solely the "artifact[s] of oppression," in other words, that
are simply the "stunting of skills and capacities." 107 In contrast with some of
the traits described in the second point, which could serve a valuable function in
a restructured world and should therefore be developed in men as well as
women, the group of traits discussed in this third point should be fostered in no
one. However, cultural feminism does not make a normative determination
regarding which traits associated with women should be fostered within all
members of society and which traits should, ideally, disappear. 108
What is missing from the work-and-parenting debate in feminist legal
theory is both a more nuanced and a broader account of the interests at stake in
the intersection between work and parenting. Such an account should recognize
the ways in which the needs and aspirations of parents, children, and
communities are implicated in parenting. It should, moreover, recognize that
valuing parenting solely for the way in which it furthers sex equality too
narrowly defines the self-interest of many women who are mothers, for whom
sex equality is only one of a complex of lenses through which they approach
work-and-parenting issues, and only one of the goods derived from protection
for parenting. At the same time, this account must recognize the complex ways
in which women's historical assignment of primary parenting responsibilities
relates to these other issues. To do so, at the same time that it recognizes the
social value of parenting and the necessity of parenting in any community that
will sustain itself, it must also recognize that women more than men conceive of
their identities as closely tied to their children because of the gender roles they
have been assigned in their subordinate status.
A feminist political vision derived from this more nuanced account would
insights of cultural feminism-its attention to relationships, community, and the need for
care-in attempting her reconstruction of feminism. See supra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
107 NANcy RASER, Cuture, Political Economy, and Difference, in JusncE
INTERRuprus, supra note 68, at 203.
108 See id; cf. Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational
Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U.L. REv. 858, 862
(1993) (arguing that cultural feminism errs in uncritically celebrating traits associated with
women due to women's oppression, and contending that an adequate feminist theory must
critically respond to women's experience and history of oppression rather than to desires and
needs embedded in their subordinate roles).
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support parenting, not because of its association with women in their
subordinate status, and not solely because support for parenting is necessary to
help women achieve equality, 109 but also because of the important role that
fostering connections generally and parenting specifically should play in a
healthy community. The goal, then, is not to dissociate parenting from women
nor to devalue the importance of the parenting relationship, but to insure that
men as well as women recognize the importance of parenting and assume
parenting responsibilities equally. Parenting is valued here because of the
important role it plays and should play in the lives of parents, children, and in
the health of communities in the world we seek to make through feminism.
V. TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE VISION OF LEGAL PROTECTION
FOR PARENTING
The vision sketched out in Part M constitutes the dominant political
philosophy in the United States today. Yet although this vision is widely held, it
conflicts with the also widely-held support-often by the same people-for
government policies that enable the adequate rearing of children. In other
words, while many Americans recognize the value of supporting parenting on a
policy level, they lack the ideological structure on which to hang these
beliefs." 0 The slippage between support for parenting on a policy level and the
dominant political philosophy contributes to the current situation in which, on
the one hand, we hear endless rhetoric about the need to support parenting and
the family and, on the other hand, we develop frameworks unable to cognize
the multiple issues at stake and unable to accomplish these ends. i '
109 Clearly, the importance of achieving workplace equality cannot be overstated. My
point here is that women's interest in achieving this goal cannot and should not be divorced
from their other needs and aspirations. In remaking the world to eliminate disparities in
power, we must also attempt to reconstruct it to become a place in which we and our children
would like to live.
110 The gap between Americans' support for policies that actively aid members of the
community and the dominant ideology has been documented by empirical research. For
example, researchers Stanley Feldman and John Zaller discovered that those who opposed
welfare programs had little difficulty expressing philosophical grounds for their opposition-
they relied on the liberty and autonomy venerated in the liberal tradition. In contrast, those
who supported welfare programs generally could not provide philosophical justifications for
their beliefs. See Stanley Feldman & John Zaller, The Political Culture of Ambivalence:
Ideological Responses to the Welfare State, 36 AM. J. POL. ScI. 268, 292-99 (1992). The
dominant political philosophy provides us no language with which to justify policies that
depart from simple enforcement of the right to be left alone.
III Another example of America's conflicting beliefs about raising children is
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Our public philosophy's preoccupation with liberty, autonomy, and rights
obscures the range of issues at stake in the intersection between parenting and
the workplace-the interests of communities in raising sound citizens; the needs
of children in becoming healthy, competent people; and the commitment of
parents to fulfilling parenting responsibilities. Moreover, this philosophy's
exaltation of individual ends prevents the state from furthering any vision that
seeks to nurture and sustain relationships between individuals. 112 In Mary Ann
Glendon's words, the ideology of liberalism deals well with "rights-bearing
issues but does not allow us to consider how to conceive of interrelationships
and transmit values that sustain the polity." 113 Neither does this ideology permit
discussion of how we, as members of a polity, can best live together. 114
It is time to stop bracketing the moral issues associated with parenting
and to value it not as an expression of individual choice or even solely as a
way to insure that women are fully integrated into the workplace, but also
for the human goods it makes possible. To do so, it is time to revise the
prevailing political vision to account for the ways in which individuals are
interrelated and interdependent. Such a revision, in turn, could ground
discussion of the ways that we, as a collective matter, can best live
together-a discussion that the dominant public vision does not permit. This
revision, moreover, would open a range of possible legal options for
handling work-and-parenting issues that would better take into account and
support the goods at stake in parenting.
A. A Revised Account of the Relations Between People
In order to more adequately reflect the ways in which people actually live
their lives, a revised account must, instead of simply conceiving of society as
demonstrated by conflicting polls showing, on the one hand, that Americans overwhelmingly
support government playing a large role in solving problems facing children, see supra note
5, and, on the other hand, that they believe that parents have sole responsibility for raising
children. See Charles M. Madigan, Poll: Cancer Cure More Likely Than Tax Cut, Cm.
TRB., Aug. 29, 1996, at Al.
112 It should be noted that my argument in this Article about the flaws of liberalism
therefore has two prongs: First, liberalism fails to recognize the ways in which humans are
actually interrelated. Second, through the law, liberalism impedes individuals from acting on
the responsibilities that derive from these relationships.
113 Glendon, supra note 69, at 33.
114 See Michael Walzer, The Commtunitarian Criique of Liberalism, in NEw
COMMUNrTARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTuTIioNs, AND CoMMUNmES, supra
note 58, at 52, 66 ("A good liberal (or social democratic) state enhances the possibilities for
cooperative coping.").
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composed of autonomous individuals, contain a more complex understanding of
individuals, of the relationships among individuals, and of communities. At the
most basic level, this understanding begins with a conception of the self that
admits the possibility of an intersubjective self-understanding, in contrast to the
liberal conception of the discrete, autonomous individual. 115 Under this view,
the "self" should be recognized to include those relationships central to how
individuals conceive of themselves. While all of a person's relationships will not
approach this fundamental level, some relationships likely will. Insofar as one's
self-conception can extend beyond a single individual, the concept of self-
interest, too, must extend beyond the individual to include the perceived
interests of others central to the individual's conception of self. This revised
view far better reflects the self-understanding of those parents who
fundamentally conceive of themselves in terms of their role as parents and for
whom the well-being of their children constitutes a fundamental part of their
own well-being.
Insofar as our relationships with others and the well-being of others are
considered part of who we are, the revised account requires changing the way
we view actions that derive from our relationships with others. Under the
liberal formulation of the autonomous self, acts performed for others are freely
chosen because individuals, seen as complete in themselves, would not perform
these acts unless they wanted to do so. In contrast, the revised formulation
admits the possibility that some acts performed for others will arise from
responsibilities that derive from fundamental relationships. In contrast to "freely
chosen acts," these responsibilities involve moral claims on the self created by
one's ties with another that are better conceived as duties than as freely chosen.
For example, in our society, I would probably not conceive of my
providing dinner for an acquaintance to fall into the category of a moral duty
because I would not consider providing dinner a responsibility that arose from
an acquaintanceship relationship. However, there is a significant chance that I
would consider eating dinner with my children to fall into this category. To the
extent that particular actions are the product of responsibilities that derive from
relationships, understanding them as "free choice" is an inappropriate framing.
Engaging in parenting responsibilities is, in this sense, different from one's
115 1 owe the development of this conception of the self to conversations with Pamela
Conover, who explores the psychological framework for intersubjective conceptions of the
self in Citizen Identities and Conceptions of the Self, 3 J. POL. PHIL. 133 (1995); see also
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LiBERAusM AND THE LzMIs OF JUSTICE 62 (1982) (defining
intersubjective conceptions of the self as those which "allow that in certain moral
circumstances, the relevant description of self may embrace more than a single individuated
human being").
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choice of chocolate ice cream over vanilla; the latter is a choice based on taste,
the former is a moral imperative based on one's understanding of one's self
(conceived of in terms of one's relationships), which stands independent of
individual preferences." 6
Moving one step away from the narrow focus on the individual, a revision
of the dominant world view should recognize interdependency among persons
as a basic condition of human life-as the normal, rather than exceptional,
state.117 Humans are never completely autonomous, this view would
recognize-they are autonomous only in some limited sense and in different
degrees at different stages of their lives.118 During most of their lives, humans
require care from others and, at some points in life-certainly in childhood but
often also in old age and at other points-they largely rely on others for care.
This need for care is a basic fact of human existence.
Thus, while the proposed reconception of the self accommodates the
spectrum between those who conceive of themselves more in terms of their
relationships with others and those who conceive of themselves far more
autonomously, the recognition of interdependence suggests that on some level,
regardless of whether relationships are incorporated into one's conception of
self, they are the basic rule of human existence rather than an aberration and
that care is a basic requirement rather than an exception to the rule. The
disjunction between these two levels of analysis is explained at least in part by
sex inequality. Men, in this view, often perceive of themselves as more
autonomous and less defined by relationships than women because much of the
carework necessitated by the human condition of interdependence has been
assigned to women. 119
Finally, while the liberal framing of parenting makes it difficult to take into
account the obvious fact that the public has a great interest in the conditions
under which children are raised, a revised ontology would bring into focus the
116 See DANIEL BELL, COWMUNrrmAmsm AND ITs C~rncs 37 (1993). The distinction
between the pursuit of preferences and the exercise of duties is one that liberal theory fails to
cognize. See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 70.
117 A number of feminist theorists have pointed out the basic interdependence of the
human condition. See, e.g., TRONTO, supra note 66, at 33; Eva Feder Kittay, Taking
Dependency Seriously: The Family and Medical Leave Act Considered in Light of the Social
Organization of Dependency Work and Gender Equality, 10 HYPATIA 8 (1995).
118 See TRONTO, supra note 66.
119 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Race and class fill two other parts of
this void. White middle- and upper-class men can feel autonomous at least in part because
many of the unpleasant but necessary tasks in this society are performed by minorities, the
working class, and the poor.
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close links between the well-being of those within communities and the health
of these communities. In the context of parenting, this ontology would shed
light on the important role that fundamental relationships play in the well-being
of citizens and on the vital links between today's good parenting and
tomorrow's good polity. Democracy requires certain traits of its citizenry to
function effectively. It demands citizens who can subordinate personal
preferences to laws and to elected representatives, appreciate the values of
freedom and democracy, recognize the legitimacy of the state, and, at least to
some extent, rationally weigh options.120 Adequate child rearing is central to
the development of these characteristics. 121
Recognition of the strong link between child rearing and the health of the
polity accords with the longstanding counsel of democratic theorists that
democracies depend on well-reared citizens. Thus, Aristotle recognized that the
upbringing of citizens crucially affects the character of the state, "at least if it is
true that it makes a difference to the soundness of a state that its children should
be sound.... And it must make a difference; for ... from children come
those who will participate in the constitution." 122 In the words of John Stuart
Mill, "if we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good government in
all its senses, . . depends, we find that the principal of them, the one which
transcends all others, is the quality of the human beings composing the society
over which government is exercised." 123 For this reason, society has a large
120 In the eloquent words of John Dewey:
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in human
intelligence and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is not belief that
these things are complete but that if given a chance they will grow and be able to
generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action.
JOHN DEWEY, TnE PuBUC AND ITS PROBLEMS 117 (1927).
121 Empirical evidence demonstrates the strong relationship between child rearing
practices and children's potential to become sound, productive future citizens. For example, a
study by social scientist Jean Richardson and her colleagues demonstrates that eighth-grade
students who took care of themselves for eleven or more hours a week were twice as likely to
be abusers of controlled substances (marijuana, tobacco, or alcohol) as those who were
actively cared for by adults, no matter the race or socioeconomic status of the children. See
ETZoNO, supra note 2, at 69. In addition, "students who took care of themselves for eleven or
more hours per week were one and a half to two times more likely 'to score high on risk
taking, anger, family conflict, and stress' than those who did not care for themselves." Id. at
69.
122 AsrOTLE, Th-m POLMCS 97 (T.A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1981).
123 JoHN STUART MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, in ON LIMERTY
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stake in the way its future citizens are raised. Again, in Mills' words:
The existing generation is master both of the training and the entire
circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly
wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and
wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most
successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation, as a
whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. If society lets any considerable
number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by
rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the
consequences.1 24
B. A Revised View of the Role of the State
Revision of the ontological understandings of the relations among people in
tan requires rethinking the prevailing view that adequate respect for the dignity
of individuals requires that the state simply enforce the right to be left alone.
That approach is based on respect for the autonomous individual for whom the
free choice in one's own life is the highest good. 125 Once the self is no longer
conceived as exclusive of its relationships and responsibilities, enforcing an
individual's right to fair procedures or to "choose" whether to stay in a job that
does not accommodate parenting is no longer sufficient to treat individuals with
dignity. Instead, treating individuals with dignity requires respecting the
importance that constitutive relationships and the responsibilities that derive
from them play in their lives. 126 In the context of the work-and-parenting issue,
it requires changing the perspective from enforcing the right to choose to parent
to providing institutional support for parenting responsibilities. Furthermore,
recognition of the close connection between the parenting of children and the
health of the polity reveals that parenting is a public good. State support for
parenting, this connection demonstrates, is both as necessary and as important
to the polity as state support for national defense, and should be pursued with at
least as much diligence. 127 Failure to provide such support abdicates the
possibility of using the state's power to help create a polity composed of a more
AND OT-ER ESSAYS 225 (John Gray ed., 1991).
124 JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS, id. at 91.
125 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); cf SANDEL,
supra note 61, at 114-16.
126 Cy Caroline Whitbeck, A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology, in BEYoND
DOMINATION: NEw PERsPECnvEs ON WOMEN AND PHmIosoPHY 64, 78-81 (Carol Gould ed.,
1983) (contrasting an ethic of rights with an ethic of responsibilities).
127 See Moody-Adams, supra note 88, at 5.
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stable, healthy citizenry. 128
My proposal moves away from the image of state neutrality on questions of
the good life. It does so based on the recognition that the ideal of state neutrality
is itself unattainable: the determination of what constitutes a neutral action in
any given case will depend on contestable assumptions about the self, the
relations between persons, and the state. 129 The current, dominant conception
of neutrality, rather than remaining neutral, celebrates self-sufficiency and the
power of the self to choose at the same time as it assumes an autonomous self
constantly engaging in free choice. This dominant conception favors a vision of
parenting in which parents detach themselves from parenting responsibilities
during the large portion of their lives that they spend at work, and in which
parenting, like other lifestyle choices, is conducted in private spaces and at
private times, during fewer and fewer hours. In addition, it favors the continued
subjugation of women and other groups within society who are assigned to
perform the caretaking responsibilities that must inevitably be performed in any
human society. In doing so, this vision of neutrality moves us away from
conditions that foster human dignity and healthy communities.
Rather than rely on a vision of the state's role that promotes separation,
isolation, and threatens the physical and emotional well-being of future citizens,
we should adopt a vision of the state that fosters connection, cooperation, and
helps children, their parents, and their communities to flourish. A non-neutral
approach to child rearing requires specific attention to questions that do not get
asked within the current framework. It requires discussion of what conditions
children within this society need to flourish and the ways that the state can
support the instantiation of these conditions.
While the basic parameters of these conditions can be set through public
discussions, parents must also be given substantial room to implement their
particular vision of child rearing. Indeed, the high value placed on liberty
within our society, requires that any viable political vision must give great
weight to the value of liberty, and therefore strive to further "good lives" rather
than a single, unitary conception of the good life. This requires ensuring that
128 Cf Robin West, Submission, Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99
HAav. L. REv. 1449, 1455-56 (1986) (arguing that the "insistence that consent is the
absolute moral trump simply traps us in our present lives" and ignores that the "state has the
potential for good").
129 A number of feminists have also challenged the liberal conception of state neutrality
on the ground that, in the United States, the supposedly neutral state has stepped out of its
supposed role of neutrality in order to strengthen men's patriarchal power over women,
including by enforcing the rights of husbands to their wives' property and persons and by
limiting women's ability to obtain divorces. See Oldu, supra note 67, at 42.
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parents have significant freedom to raise their children according to their own
personal visions. It also requires recognizing that what it means to be a parent,
what it means to be a child, and what constitutes good care for children vary
enormously both within and between cultures and over time. 130 Therefore,
parents should, within broad parameters, generally have the ability to rear
children as they see fit. 131 The state, in this model, would provide institutional
support for parenting, but generally without determining the substantive content
of parenting. In contrast to the existing framework in employment law, which
allows parents to define their children's needs but forces them to respond to
these needs privately, my proposal would circumvent the autonomy/dependence
dichotomy in liberal thought by allowing parents generally to define these needs
while granting public support to help these needs.
In advocating replacement of the dominant political vision, I have argued
that its inadequacy is revealed in part by the way in which it conflicts with the
perspective from which many view the world and by its inability to support the
aspirations of most of us for our children and our communities. I want to
emphasize that although the ways in which we live and our aspirations point to
inadequacies in the existing liberal ontology and political program, I rely on
neither popular support nor "shared understandings" to justify my alternative
vision of the state's proper role. Instead, I justify it based on an explicit
normative judgment that support for parenting will lead us to a better society
than the existing vision. The "common good" that I advocate is not something
either irrefutable or discoverable, but is, instead, constructed, and open to
political discussion, negotiation, and disagreement. 132
130 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Constructing Love, Desire, and Care, in SEX,
PREFERENcE, ANiD FAMILY, supra note 2, at 31.
131 I use the term "generally" with purpose here. The value of parental autonomy must
be considered in concert with other values that may sometimes outweigh parental autonomy.
For example, a parent's determination that a child needs to be placed in a tub of scalding
water for disciplinary reasons should not be considered an acceptable exercise of parental
autonomy. Children, in this view, should not be viewed as the property of parents that liberal
theory sometimes makes them out to be, but neither should they be viewed simply as wards of
the polity. The tendency of liberal theory to dichotomize the world in general and rights in
particular into either/or categories suggests the need for a more nuanced account of the status
of children.
132 Thus, although I have relied to a considerable extent on the work of theorists who
have been labeled "communitarian" in formulating my critique of liberalism and in
constructing an alternative vision, I part company with the view often attributed to such
theorists that the common good is unitary, uncontestable, and discoverable through unearthing
previously settled "shared understandings." I note, however, that much of this position has
already been explicitly rejected by many theorists dubbed "communitarian." See, e.g.,
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C. Toward a Revised Parenting and Work Policy
Applying this revised vision to the intersection of work and family would
make clear that support for parenting should not only further the value of sex
equality, it should also help give children the care they need, help parents
realize responsibilities essential to their leading lives they consider moral, and
foster the character traits and capacities of citizens that a democratic society
requires. This recognition, in turn, requires replacing the prevailing models for
considering work-and-parenting issues. In their place belongs a framework that
better recognizes the complexity of needs and aspirations at stake and the
multiplicity of goods that can be realized within the parenting relationship-a
model that sees a more integral role for state protection of parenting than simple
crisis management.
Transforming the vision of the appropriate role of the state and the issues at
stake in the intersection between work and parenting opens up an array of
possible legal reforms for democratic deliberation. Is it not as important to
provide for a system of compensation when parents need time off from work to
parent as it is to provide workers' and unemployment compensation? 133 In
order to ensure that parents who wish to do so have sufficient time to parent,
should it be unlawful for employers to require parents of young children to
work more than a set amount of hours each day? Should on-site day care that
allows parents to have ready contact with children be required of certain
employers? Should providing flex-time be required? Should employers be
required to guarantee breaks for mothers who breast-feed? Should optional six-
month parenting leaves be made available to parents? Once the questions
concerning protection for parenting are broadened from the dominant
assumptions embodied within the current legal framework, the issues for
discussion are unlimited.
D. Objections to Moving Away from the Dominant Vision
The proposal for change presented here raises a number of possible
objections. In this Part, I address two major groups of concerns: first, liberal
objections to the state moving away from existing conceptions of neutrality;
SANDEL, supra note 61, at 320-21. I also note that any constructed common vision of the
good life (or, in my view, good lives) cannot be developed in the abstract but must take into
account the understandings of members of the society.
133 Because such leave would be justified in part by the state's interest in ensuring the
development of its future citizens, principles of fairness would suggest that the state bear at
least some part of the economic burden for this leave.
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second, feminist theory objections that the proposed framework for parenting
proposed would redound to women's detriment.
1. The Non-Neutral State
The proposal that the state move away from its role of neutral enforcer of
the right to be left alone towards a positive role in aiding parenting raises two
principal objections. First, the proposition that the state should support any
activity, including parenting, rather than allow citizens to choose which
activities they themselves support might be contested. Second, some might
propose a "slippery slope" objection based on the lengths that the government
may go in infringing liberty once it steps outside its position of neutrality to
support parenting. In other words, this second objection might be phrased the
following way:
If we decide that the state can seek to further its interest in creating solid
citizens by allowing employees such rights as the right to take time off, why
can't we require parents (or simply mothers) of young children to take time off
to advance that same interest? For that matter, why can't the state then take
other measures that it believes would benefit good citizens, such as, for
example, forbidding them to watch any television except educational
television?134
The heart of both these objections concerns the extent and manner in which the
government may move outside of its role of simple protector of the right to be
left alone and, instead, interfere with individual choice by privileging a
particular activity based on a societal determination to do so.
The objection to the state privileging certain activities over others is entitled
to considerable weight, although not enough to trump the other interests at
issue. It is inevitable that disparate conceptions of the good will exist in any
society. For some, that conception of the good will more importantly weigh
sound future citizens and parents who are allowed to fully satisfy their parenting
responsibilities; for others that good will more heavily weigh a society in which
art and music play an important role. Where these visions of the good conflict,
furthering one vision of the good may require tradeoffs with other goods. Such
tradeoffs are an inescapable part of living in society; indeed, in Isaiah Berlin's
134 The hypothetical objection posed here represents a response to this proposal that
reflects liberalism's distrust of non-neutral state action. See, e.g., supra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text. I am indebted to a conversation with Thomas Spragens for helping me to
formulate my response to this objection.
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words, they are "an inescapable characteristic of the human condition." 135
Isaiah Berlin eloquently describes the tradeoffs between competing visions
of the good when he writes that "[tjhe world that we encounter in ordinary
experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally
ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others." 136 The trade-offs involved between
ultimate ends are in part the reason that liberal society places such emphasis on
the individual's right to his or her own free choice. 137 Yet some societal goods
cannot adequately be pursued on an individual level. In such cases, again in
Berlin's words: "[the extent of a man's, or a people's, liberty to choose to live
as they desire must be weighed against the claims of many other values, of
which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are perhaps
the most obvious examples." 138
Thus, in answer to the question "Why allow the state to support any
particular activity, including parenting, when this support will, to some extent,
infringe on individual liberty to choose?" I suggest that two factors together
justify state support. First, parenting cannot be adequately pursued within a
framework of individual choice. Second, communities' interests in good
citizens, children's needs for parenting, and parents' comnmitment to parenting
are so compelling as to justify the state's active support of parenting despite
some infringements on individual choice. Promoting some base level of
adequacy of childbearing and child rearing is an interest that lies at the heart of
a democracy's ability to perpetuate itself,139 at the heart of a child's important
interest in becoming a stable person, and at the core of many parents' views of
themselves as moral persons. Few other activities will weigh so heavily in the
balance against liberty interests.
The discussion of liberty brings me to the second objection: the possibility
13 5 ISAIAH BMM, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR ESSAYS ON LiBEaTY 118, 169
(1969); see also ANDREW KOPPamVAN, ANnIsCuMINATION LAW AND SOciAL EQUAliTY
216(1996).
13 6 BERLIN, supra note 135, at 168.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 170.
139 As Amy Gutmann notes, a democracy's interest in perpetuating itself does not
legitimate its taking measures to replicate current practices. See Amy Gutmann,
Undemocratic Education, in LIBERALSM AND THE MoRAL LnF, 71, 78-79 (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 1989). Rather, it requires that the state cultivate the capacities necessary for
democratic deliberation and decisionmaking without restricting deliberation about the good
life itself. To the extent that current practices restrict deliberation by being repressive and
discriminatory, democracy requires their eradication, not their perpetuation.
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that once the state steps outside of its role of neutral arbiter, it could greatly
infringe on liberty in its support of parenting. The fact of state support for
parenting should not, however, end the discussion regarding liberty. In a
society such as ours, which values liberty so highly, support for parenting must
be reconciled as much as possible with autonomy. Adoption of less coercive
methods by the state is therefore clearly the more preferable route to supporting
parenting. Thus, ensuring that employees will have the opportunity to take
leave from work is less problematic than decreeing that they must. 14
My proposal advocates support for parenting without offering any fail-safe
formula for determining how far the state may infringe on individual liberty to
pursue that goal. Formulation of any such blanket rule, I believe, is impossible.
Instead, the decision can be made only through reasoned deliberation in the
democratic process. For those who feel uncomfortable with this determination,
I offer two observations. First, choosing the alternative of never allowing the
state to privilege some life paths over others leaves in place a status quo that
may be equally or even more constraining of individual freedom but result in
far more damage to interests deemed important by many in the community. For
example, the failure to support parenting may result in a situation in which
parents are constrained to work long hours to the detriment of themselves,
children, and society. Second, the clear bias in the United States is toward
allowing liberty automatically to trump other values. Insisting that the value of
liberty should be weighed against other values places liberty in better
perspective: because of the paramount regard in which liberty is held, far less
danger exists that it will be given too little weight than the danger that currently
exists that it will be given such tremendous weight that it will prevent the
achievement of valued ends.
2. Sex Equality
In addition to the first set of objections, which come squarely from within
mainstream liberalism, three objections might be leveled at this proposal from a
feminist perspective. First, it might be objected that using the liberal state-
which has historically been linked to patriarchal privilege-to support parenting
by providing legal protection will either not improve the position of women or,
140 And probably more effective, as well. It is not difficult to imagine that requiring an
unwilling parent to leave work in order to be at home with their children might result in poor
parenting during the enforced time together. In a society that values individual decisionmaldng
as highly as our own, the far better route would be to make the choice to parent a true option
for parents rather than either a requirement or the hollow promise that it is now. Cf.
KOPPELMAN, supra note 135, at 217-18.
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worse, will further entrench their subordinate position. A number of feminist
theorists have argued that the state itself is deeply linked to patriarchal
structures that impedes the emergence of feminist principles. 141 While the
power of this critique of the state is undeniable, unfortunately, the alternatives
are few. 142 The ways in which law affects both the lived reality of women's
lives and reinforces the nation's reigning ideology make attempts to change the
law a crucial feminist project. Thus, the link between the state and patriarchal
privilege calls generally for caution and for considerable attention to the type of
intervention sought of the state, but not for complete retreat from attempts to
use law as a vehicle for social change.
In this regard, this proposal provides a vehicle through which the stated
rhetoric of the regime (usually phrased in terms of concern for children, a
"kinder, gentler nation") can be used to disrupt some of the links between
patriarchy and the state. As Wendy Brown argues, the legacy of gender
subordination in the modem liberal state is located "in the terms of liberal
discourse that configure and organize liberal jurisprudence, public policy, and
popular consciousness. " 143 As a tactical matter, few better issues exist with
which to demonstrate the shortcomings of liberal theory and to muster support
for its revision than parenting issues, since such issues implicate the needs of
children who have caught the popular imagination in a way that, in a society
accustomed to the subordination of women, the needs and aspirations of women
have not. 144
Second, it might be argued that my analysis largely assumes that the
relevant interests that support parenting protections will coincide and therefore
overlooks the way in which these interests may conflict. In this view, gender
equality interests can often conflict with the needs of children, the needs of
mothers can conflict with the needs of children, the interests of parents can
141 See, e.g., DAVINA COOPER, PowER IN STRUGGLE: FEMINISM, SEXUALTY, AND THE
STATE 71 (1995) ("While the state may not finction to maintain the interests of a particular
class or grouping, gender, race or economic principles inform the state's reaction to changing
sexual discourse and practices."); MacKinnon, supra note 48; BROWN, supra note 71.
142 In Catharine MacKinnon's words: "[tIreacherous and uncertain and alien and slow,
law has not been women's instrument of choice. Their view seems to be that law should not
be let off the hook, is too powerful to be ignored, and is better than violence-if not by
much." MacKinnon, supra note 48, at 1285.
143 BROWN, supra note 71, at 138.
144 See id. at 164 ("Mhe trap consists in working with formulations of personhood,
citizenship, and politics that themselves contain women's subordination, that can indeed be
extended to women, or to activities inside 'the family,' but are not thereby emancipated from
their masculinism by virtue of such extension.").
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diverge from one another, and the needs of communities can diverge from the
needs of parents. By assuming the convergence of the interests of parents,
children, and family, according to this objection, I am romanticizing
relationships between persons in a manner that ignores the reality of
relationships and the power disparities that operate within society.
While the legitimate interests of children, mothers, and fathers potentially
(and sometimes actually) conflict, at the level of lived experience, these
interests are often sufficiently interrelated that they can and should be pursued
simultaneously. Thus, while in an abstract situation, the needs of children can
be considered separately from the needs of parents, in the real world, the
interests of both parents and children are generally far more interrelated. For
example, as an abstract matter, it might be argued that it is better for children to
have a parent stay at home with them and devote the better part of his or her
life to them. However, in the real world, children are parented by real people
whose own needs and aspirations in employment are important to them, and are
part of a family with economic needs that must be fulfilled. Even considering
the issue only from the perspective of the child's welfare, a happy, fulfilled
parent for some part of the day is far more in the interest of the child than a
disgruntled, unfulfilled parent for all of it; moreover, food on the table is better
than a parent home all day with no food to eat. By the same token, while it is
possible to consider gender equality interests as independent from and,
possibly, in conflict with the interests of children, in fact, these interests are also
interrelated. 145 Because mothers often take their children's interest into account
in making decisions, 146 furthering interests in sex equality requires factoring in
the well-being of children.
In other words, the interests of children, mothers, fathers, and the
community-while clearly not identical, and perhaps often in potential
conflict-are interrelated enough generally to make it possible to craft measures
in which they coincide. The goal should be to construct arrangements that
improve the position of all these parties rather than set up zero-sum situations in
which satisfying some operates to the detriment of others. To do so, however,
will require careful attention to the ways in which the aspirations and needs of
145 See, e.g., SUsAN MoLnm OKaN, JusTIcE, GmND AND T-E FAMmY (1989).
146 A national survey by the Washington Post and ABC found that 9 out of 10 women
had made significant sacrifices at work because of their children: 59% of women stated that
they had given up or delayed career ambitions on account of their children, 64% of women
stated that they had delayed or decided against taking a full-time job outside of the home, and
47% reported on cutting back on the number of hours worked for this reason. See Richard
Morin, National Poll Finds Support for Day Care as Employee Benefit, WASH. PosT, Sept.
3, 1989, at A17.
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affected parties may conflict. In this way, the situation is similar to the debate
regarding fetal hazards. Although the prevailing view is to cast the issue in
terms of conflict between the mother and fetus, as one commentator notes, this
model "has undermined the development of effective policy by focusing on the
competing rather than the common needs of the mother and the fetus." 147 A
more productive approach is to craft policy in order to promote the needs of
both mother and fetus.
Because of the strong link between the disproportionate parenting
responsibilities assigned to women and their disempowerment, positive support
for parenting should be pursued in concert with measures that encourage
breaking down the sex division in parenting. Support for parenting must
therefore not only be phrased in sex-neutral terms but must genuinely be
available to parents of both sexes. Within that framework, and with careful
attention to the ways in which interests might diverge, proposals can be crafted
in which sex equality interests and the other interests at stake in parenting
support rather than conflict with one another.
The third objection from feminist theory derives from women's historical
exclusion from political power and their current marginalized status in public
debate. From this position, a legitimate worry might arise that my advocating
deliberation over the common good(s) of the community will result in
deliberations that marginalize women's voices and a vision that neglects the
needs and aspirations of women. The short answer to this objection, in my
view, is that this feared nightmare is the state in which we live today.
Liberalism rests on a particular vision of the good-a good that values
autonomy and choice over other values. This vision was developed on the back
of women's exclusion and subordination, and it continues to ignore the needs
and aspirations of real, historical women and their views of the world. I am
therefore advocating replacement of one inevitably non-neutral vision by
another that better reflects both the lived reality of women's lives, the needs of
parents, children, and communities, and that better provides a vision for
ordering our lives together than the current model. Focusing attention on the
way in which any vision of the good is an artificial construct, including the
vision promulgated by liberalism, calls into question the inevitability of those
visions that have historically disadvantaged women and suggests the importance
of including different perspectives in the discussion over what a better vision
would look like.
147Rethinl'ng Motherhood, supra note 31, at 1336; see also, e.g., Johnsen, supra note
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VI. CONCLUSION
In any society, the law is an institution that performs a number of functions
simultaneously. It expresses a vision of the current state of affairs-who and
where its members now are, both as a society and as individuals. It also reflects
a vision for the future-who its members should be and what the polity should
become. Finally, by limiting some possibilities and encouraging others, the law
ultimately helps to order the future by shaping who members of the polity
actually become and how they live together. By the law's failure to recognize
and support important needs and aspirations at stake in the intersection between
work and parenting, American law currently reflects a society composed of
isolated individuals, aspires to nothing more, and creates conditions inhospitable
to human connection, human dignity, and human development. It is time to
reconsider whether this vision accurately represents the society in which we
actually live, whether it reflects our aspirations for who we want to become,
and whether it leads us toward a world in which we would want to live and
raise our children.
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